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I. INTRODUCTION
In the first few years of dealing with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,1 the courts asserted that while the subjects of
judicial review had expanded, its nature had not really changed.2 For a
while this meant a denial, consistent with the traditional stance of the
courts under division of powers review, that "political" or policy-based
decisions were required by the courts. This stance has changed
dramatically.3 Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada now express
their difficulties *rith the task of judicial review, because of the
policy-based decisions required in Charter cases.4 This concern is played
1 Part I of the ConstitutionAc 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor VehicleAct, RS.B.C. 1979, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
3 For a discussion of this change, see: D. Gibson, "The Deferential Trojan Horse: A Decade of
Charter Decisions" (1993) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 417 at 446, where the author reviews the court's
changing approach to the Charter, from the "initial fervour" to the apparent "judicial ennui" at 446;
R. Elliot, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1989-90 Term" (1991), 2 S.C.LR. (2d) 83 at
94ff where the author discusses the "demise of the checking function under the Charter;" and D.
Stratas, The Charter of Rights in Litigation: Direction from the Supreme Court of Canada, vol. 1
(Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1990), paras. 1:02 [1](a), (b), and (c).
4 B. Wilson, "Constitutional Advocacy" (1992) 24 Ottawa L Rev. 265; and G. La Forest, "The
Balancing of Interest under the Charter" (1992) 2 N.J.C.L. 133.
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out in the ongoing development of the section 1 test5 and in other
contexts, such as the interpretation of fundamental justice under section
7 of the Charter.6 Solutions to the conundrum of reconciling the task of
judicial review with an appropriate degree of deference to democratic
decisions remain elusive.
The courts' initial reaction to the impact of the Charter on
procedural issues was similar. It seemed that, although there would be
some expansion of remedial powers, basic procedures would go
unchanged. 7 This was certainly the case with regard to the rules of
standing. Section 24 of the Charter contains a test of standing, providing
that anyone "whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter,
have been infringed or denied" might seek an appropriate and just
remedy. This was initially treated as over-restrictive and narrower than
the tests of standing that had developed before the Charter. The courts'
early reaction to section 24 was that it was supplementary only. It did
not change the basic tests of standing. Thus, when the standing of a
corporation to rely on the freedom of religion was challenged in Big
M8--on the basis that it did not possess any freedom of religion, or that
its freedom of religion had not been infringed or denied-the court
responded that Big M Drug Mart had private standing by virtue of being
subjected to criminal proceedings under the Lord's DayAct,9 and that it
was therefore entitled to raise issues relating to the constitutionality of
the law under which it was charged. The court also indicated that public
interest standing rules would apply to Charter challenges.
Since this generous introduction, significant restrictions on
standing have developed in Charter jurisprudence. In Canadian Council
of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),10 the
5 The process of introducing "flexibility" or legislative deference into the section 1 test was
stipulated in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, commenced withR. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [hereinafter Edwards Books], and continued with Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
(AG.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Irwin Toy], and in McIlnneyv. University of Guelph, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 229. See the commentary in P.W. Hogg, "Section 1 Revisited" (1991) 1 NJ.C.L 1 at 18-23;
Elliot, supra note 3 at 145-50; and Stratas, supra note 3, para. 6:05.
6 Reference Re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123,per
Lamer J. (as he then was); and Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519
[hereinafter Rodriguez] per Sopinka . See also Elliot, ibid. at 105-09, regarding the interpretation of
section 7, where the author makes the same point regarding other Charter rights and freedoms.
7 Mills v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; and R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295
[hereinafter Big M].
8 Ibid.
9 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.
10 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 [hereinafter Canadian Council of Churches].
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Supreme Court of Canada indicated that it would not expand the
principles governing public interest standing. In the same case, and in
Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (A.G.),11 the court adopted a narrow
approach to the application of those principles. In Irwin Toy, corporate
parties were not permitted to argue that the Charter rights of individuals
had been violated. This was not initially described as a restriction on
standing, although it had a similar effect. But in Hy and Zel's, the Irwin
Toy rule became a rule of standing, with application to individuals as
well as corporations. Parties whose own Charter rights were not affected
were denied standing to challenge a Sunday closing law, even though
they were threatened with prosecution under the law. These decisions
stand in contrast to Big M, and show how far the court has retreated
from that case.
I will contend that the Supreme Court of Canada, in its now
cautious approach to the Charter, has overcompensated for its original
generosity. Its new approach to standing does not respond to the
purposes underlying standing rules. These purposes fall into two
categories: the efficient use of scarce judicial resources, and the
adversarial process.12 The new standing jurisprudence does not clearly
address nor forward these purposes. The result is an appearance, at
least, of an evasion of the merits in these cases.
In this article, I will examine the standing rules applicable to
Charter litigation, focusing on actions or applications for a declaration of
total or partial invalidity of legislation.13 I will commence with a survey
of the rationales for standing rules. An examination of thejurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding public interest
standing, both pre- and post-Charter, will demonstrate that the court's
post-Charter approach is neither consistent with the prior case law, nor
does it forward the purposes of standing law. I will then consider
alternative forms of standing for Charter declaratory applications. The
use of the traditional form of private standing as established in Smith v.
11 This case was consolidated with Paul Magder Furs Ltd. v. Ontario (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 675
[hereinafter Hy and Zelrs].
12 Another concern, that of the nature of issues suitable for judicial determination, is a matter
of justiciability, not standing; see infra note 15 and accompanying text. The purposes of standing
rules are considered below under Part II.
13 The remedy could involve striking down the law or variations upon that, all of which are
available under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11, such as severance, reading down, or reading up legislation: Schachter v. Canada,[19921 2 S.C.R. 679 [hereinafter Schachter].
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Ontario (A.G.)14 has been severely and, I will suggest, unnecessarily
restricted. However, there is a potential for a new form of private
standing applicable to Charter declaratory applications, in the "section
24" plaintiff. The implications of both of these developments will be
considered.
II. RATIONALES FOR STANDING RULES
The underlying concerns or rationales for the doctrine of
standing can be placed in three general categories: the economical use of
scarce judicial resources, the requirements of the adversarial process,
and the proper role of the court (i.e., the justiciability or appropriateness
for legal determination of issues). Although justiciability issues have
been dealt with in a number of standing cases, they relate to the question
posed, rather than the party posing it, and are generally dealt with
separately from standing issues.15 I will be focusing on the limitation of
access to certain parties and will therefore examine standing
jurisprudence in terms of the first two categories of concerns.16
14 [1924] S.C.R. 331 [hereinafter Smith].
15 This is consistent with the public interest standing jurisprudence discussed below, under
"Part III. Public Interest Standing." while justiciability was considered in a number of these
decisions, it was not directly incorporated into the public interest standing test stated in Canada
(Mmister of Justice) v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 [hereinafter Borowski #1], discussed infra at
notes 37-39 and accompanying text (although it is related to the "serious questions" aspect of the
test). Fiday v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 [hereinafter Finlay] at 632,
indicated that the "concern about the proper role of the courts and their constitutional relationship
to the other branches of government is addressed by the requirement of justiciability," and that
while "justiciability is always a matter of concern for the courts ... it is a matter of particular concern
in the recognition of public interest standing." The validity of a law or government act under the
Charter is almost always a justiciable issue (Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441);
however, in the context of Charter challenges, in addition to raising issues distinct from standing,
justiciability is unlikely to create a bar to litigation: see New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova
Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319. See also K. Roach, Constitutional
Remedies In Canada (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994), para. 5.90. See also Ontario Law
Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Standing (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General,
1989) at 56-57 [hereinafter Ontario Law Reform Commission]; and Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia, Report on Civil Litigation in the Public Interest, LRC 47 (Vancouver Ministry of
the Attorney General, 1980) at 61 [hereinafter Law Reform Commission of British Columbia],
taking the position that justiciability should be considered independently of standing.
16 Commentators and case law have also referred to the exclusion of "busybodies" as a
rationale for standing requirements. Just who is a busybody is not clear. Law Reform Commission
of British Columbia, ibid at 61; Ontario Law Reform Commission, ibid at 59. This "rationale" has
been referred to both in the context of access concerns (Finlay, ibid at 631, referring to the need to
screen out busybodies in the allocation of scarce judicial resources) and concerns relating to the
requirements of the adversarial system (Ontario Law Reform Commission, ibid at 60, referring to
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The first collection of concerns relates to the efficiency or
economy of ensuring that appropriate use is made of scarce judicial
resources. One aspect of these concerns is the fear that a failure to
control access may result in a "flood" of unnecessary and inappropriate
litigation. No such flood has ever been pointed to by the courts, and the
potential for a flood has been often doubted. Private costs of litigation
form "an initial screening barrier of considerable height," with the result
that
[w]hen the "floodgates" of litigation are opened to some new class of controversy ... it is
notable how rarely one can discern the flood that the dissenters feared. The plaintiff...
must feel strongly enough about the issue in question to pay the bills.... The idle and
whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal
literature, not the courtroom. 17
Nonetheless, there is in overall terms a greater demand on court
resources than can be comfortably met,1 8 which is reflected in a
continuing concern with their economical and efficient use. 19 One could
preserve scarce judicial resources by applying them only to actual
disputes between personally affected parties, but countervailing
considerations prevent such an absolutist approach.2 0 Sometimes
judicial economy is served by hearing cases that do not technically
busybodies in the context of concerns about adequate advocacy or representation of legal interests
that may be incidentally affected by a decision; and Hy and Zel's, supra note 11 at 702, per
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., describing one of the traditional justifications for standing rules as the
prevention of suits by "busybodies" in order to "ensure that issues are fully canvassed by promoting
the use of the judicial process to decide live disputes between parties as opposed to hypothetical
ones"), but does not appear to have any content that distinguishes itself from one or the other of
these categories.
1 7 KE. Scott, "Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis" (1973) 86 Harv. L
Rev. 645 at 673-74. See also Ontario Law Reform Commission, ibi at 45-48; Law Reform
Commission of British Columbia, ibi at 59; Thorson v. Canada (A.G.), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138
[hereinafter Thorson], as discussed infra note 30 and accompanying text; and L'Heureux-Dub6 J.,
dissenting in Hy and Zel's, ibid at 712. B.L Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The
Function and Scope of Judicial Review, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 189, argues that a
flood is hypothetically possible, and that although exaggerated fears should not constitute a reason
for a blanket denial of standing, if excessive demands materialized, this would justify a denial of
standing.
18 Scott, ibid. at 671-72 points out that supply and demand rules do not adequately control the
demand because of the subsidized nature of service.
1 9 Finay, supra note 15 at 631, as discussed infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; T.A.
Cromwell, Locus Standi." A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1986) at 191; and Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10, as discussed infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
20 As discussed in the jurisprudence dealt with below under Part IIl. See particularly, Hy and
Zel's, supra note 11, per L'Heureux-Dub6 J., in dissent, at 702-06. See also P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 1263.
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present a live dispute.21 Further, the court's function of ensuring
government compliance with the law, and particularly with the
constitution, means that access to the court even solely for this purpose
may be an appropriate use of scarce judicial resources.
The second category of concerns relates to the requirements of
the adversarial process. Among these are the definition of the issue to
be determined and the way in which it is presented to the court. A
justiciable issue that is presented in an abstract way, without a concrete
factual context, may not be as usefully dealt with by the courts as would
be a live dispute.2 2 The definition and presentation of issues are
legitimate concerns, but may be linked to an inappropriate degree to the
question of private or public standing. Private declaratory actions may
also present issues in an overly abstract way, or may fail to provide an
adequate factual context. Conversely, actions commenced by public
interest plaintiffs may present precise issues in a complete factual
context.23 Further, where concerns are raised as to the constitutionality
of a law, "the primary focus is on the law itself, not the position of the
parties," 24 and a specific factual context may be irrelevant.25 While
standing may be pertinent, it cannot substitute for direct consideration
2 1 Roach, supra note 15, para 5.230, discussing Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10.
See the discussion infa note 64 and accompanying text. See also Hy and Zel's, ibid. per L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. in dissent, at 711, 717-20. Borowsld v. Canada (AG.), [19891 1 S.C.R. 342 [hereinafter
Borowski #2], made a similar point with regard to the consideration of moot issues.
22 Borowski #1, supra note 15, as discussed infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text;
Canadian Council of Churches, ibid., as discussed infra in the text following note 64. Strayer, supra
note 17 at 190, argues that concerns about general or abstract questions can usually be addressed
through tests of justiciability. However, he also acknowledges the implicit value of standing rules in
ensuring that a plaintiff will be able to point to a specific application of the law, enabling the court
to see the effect of the law. For this reason he suggests that standing should be denied where the
plaintiff's lack of a special interest would result in an excessively general or abstract issue.
Restricting standing on this basis should produce a "more realistic jurisprudence devoted to the
assessment of actual, not imagined, effects of impugned legislation."
23 See, generally, the discussion of abstract questions in RJ. Sharpe, "Mootness, Abstract
Questions and Alternative Grounds: Deciding Whether to Decide" in Ri. Sharpe, ed., Charter
Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 327 at 335-40. Cromwell, supra note 19 at 173, and
Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 15 at 57-58, relying on the imperfection of the
relationship between standing and the definition of an issue or the concreteness of a factual picture,
argue that this concern should be addressed directly by the court and that this does not justify
limiting standing to directly affected persons. See also the discussion of this issue, infra notes 66-67
and accompanying text.
24 Hy and Zel's, supra note 11 at 710,per L'Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting.
2 5 
. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 at 955, approving a pre-trial ruling on a Charter
application of "[an apparently meritorious Chatter challenge of the law under which the accused is
charged which is not dependent on facts to be elicited during the trial." See the discussion infra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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of the definition of an issue or the adequacy of a factual context. If
standing is to be denied for these reasons, this should be done only after
a purposive analysis, where the court is satisfied that the party's standing
is associated with such problems in the circumstances of the case.
Another issue relating to the requirements of the adversarial
system that may be associated with standing is the need for an
appropriate advocate. Plaintiffs with traditional private interests at
stake have been assumed to be appropriate representatives of the
interest they possess. They are presumed to be motivated to provide full
and competent advocacy. The verity of these assumptions, and even
more so, the lack of application of these assumptions to public interest
plaintiffs, are very questionable2 6 Public interest plaintiffs sufficiently
"interested" to incur the cost and inconvenience of litigation are
obviously motivated adversaries. A privately interested party has not
been selected as a representative and will not necessarily portray the
perspective of others with similar interests. In any event, if particular
perspectives are not adequately represented in a suit, this deficiency can
be overcome by the use of intervenors.27
These rationales for standing have been considered in thejurisprudence discussed below. Developing judicial recognition of these
purposes has recently been followed by their lack of application or
misapplication. It will be argued that the Supreme Court's recent
standing decisions are no longer achieving, or perhaps even pursuing,
these purposes.
III. PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING
I will commence with an examination of the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of Canada that established the requirements for a
26 Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 15 at 58; Law Reform Commission of British
Columbia, supra note 15 at 61; Cromwell, supra note 19 at 173; WA. Bogart, "Understanding
Standing, Chapter IV: Minister of Finance of Canada v. Finlay" (1988) 10 S.C.LR. 377 at 395; and
Roach, supra note 15, para 5.220, all take the position that the absence of a traditional legal interest
does not mean that a plaintiff will present a case with less competence or zeal.
27 See Ontario Law Reform Commission, ibid at 60; and Bogart, ibid at 392 and 395-96. In
Borowski #1, supra note 15 at 358-59, in discussing the requirement for a motivated adversary in the
context of a moot case, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that private parties who had lost
their legal interest in an issue might still be motivated by practical consequences. Further, if a
private party was no longer motivated to pursue the suit, an intervenor might provide suitable
advocacy.
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discretionary grant of public interest standing.28 In two more recent
decisions,29 the court took a more restrictive approach to public interest
standing. I will first consider these decisions in terms of their
contributions to the law relating to public interest standing.
Subsequently, I will consider their effect on the requirements of private
standing.
A. The Origin and Expansion of Public Interest Standing
The first grant of public interest standing occurred in Thorson.30
Thorson, as a taxpayer suing in a class action, challenged the
constitutionality of official bilingualism legislation and the expenditure
of funds to implement it. The statute was declaratory only; it did not
subject the public or any sector of the public to regulation. The
Attorney General had declined to commence or agree to proceedings to
challenge the validity of the statute. The court exercised its discretion to
grant Thorson public interest standing because he raised a justiciable
issue that would not otherwise be subject to judicial review. Ensuring
government compliance with the constitution was seen as more
important than procedural concerns relating to a lack of private
standing.
In reaching this conclusion Laskin J. (as he then was), for the
majority, expressed doubt that any inordinate number of lawsuits would
follow an expansion of standing rules. In any event he was satisfied that
the courts possessed adequate tools to control declaratory actions
through their discretion in granting or refusing declarations, or by
staying proceedings or imposing costs.
In McNeil,3 1 a newspaper editor concerned about the wide
powers of the Nova Scotia Board of Censors, and particularly about its
decision to prohibit the exhibition of the film Last Tango in Paris,
brought a constitutional challenge to the censorship legislation. This
was a regulatory statute, but the regulated theatre owners most directly
affected by the statute had not seen fit to challenge it.32 Further,
2 8 Thorson, supra note 17; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil (1975), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265
[hereinafter McNeil]; Borowski #2, supra note 21; and Finlay, supra note 15.
29 Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10; and Hy and Zd's, supra note 11.
30 Supra note 17.
31 Supra note 28.
32 Whether theatre owners would be entitled to bring declaratory applications or would have
to await actual or threatened prosecution was not addressed by the court.
1995]
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members of the public were also directly affected because of limits upon
the films they might view. Public interest standing was granted, in part,
so that this interest or "real stake" in the issue could be brought before
the court. McNeil's interest was a factor when the court considered
whether there were other reasonable and effective means to challenge
the law. The court discounted potential litigation by theatre owners as a
reasonable way to bring the challenge, partly because they might hesitate
to challenge the administrative scheme under which they did business,
and partly because they would not represent the public interest
represented by McNeil.
The third case was Borowski #1,33 a challenge under the
Canadian Bill of Rights34 to the abortion provisions of the Criminal
Code3S of Canada. Martland J. for the majority held that Borowski, a
well-known "right to life" advocate with a history of involvement in the
issue, had standing to enforce the alleged rights of foetuses under the
Bill of Rights. The provisions of the Code challenged in the action were
exculpatory and thus unlikely to be raised in criminal proceedings.
Prospective fathers, although directly affected, could not reasonably be
expected to challenge the legislation in court because of time
constraints.3 6 Summarizing the requirements of public interest standing
which he found to have been met, Martland J. held that Borowski had
met the three requirements to establish public interest standing. He had
demonstrated:
1. "a serious issue;"37
33 Supra note 15.
34 S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
3 5 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
36 The subsequent case of Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530, in which a prospective
father asserted the alleged right of a foetus, demonstrates that while time constraints may not
prevent such litigation, they have a definite adverse effect. The matter proceeded with extreme
haste, with the Supreme Court of Canada calling an emergency summer session to deal with it. A
week before the Supreme Court hearing which resulted in the vacating of the injunction prohibiting
Ms. Daigle from having an abortion, Ms. Daigle risked contempt sanctions and obtained an
abortion. She was eighteen weeks pregnant when the proceedings commenced and was close to
twenty-two weeks pregnant when she obtained the abortion. See M. Shaffer, "Foetal Rights and
Regulation of Abortion" (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 58.
37 This part of the public interest standing test applies, to the public interest plaintiff,
essentially the same requirement that may be applied in the case of a plaintiff with private standing
in an application to strike out a claim on the basis that it presents no reasonable cause of action:
Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10 at 253-54. While the serious issue test is expressed as a
part of the test of public interest standing, it, like justiciability, is addressed to what issues may be
litigated rather than who may litigate them. Decisions based on this part of the standing test are
generally not addressed to the concerns that are the focus of this article.
[VOL 33 NO. 1
1995] Standing in Charter Declaratory Actions 161
2. "that he is affected by it directly or that he has a genuine interest
as a citizen" in the issue;38 and
3. "that there is no other reasonable and effective manner in which
the issue may be brought before the Court."39
38 Clearly Borowski was not directly affected in any way, and passed this test by virtue of
having a genuine interest as a citizen in the legal issues raised. Cromwell, supra note 19 at 87,
commenting on Borowski #1, suggests that this requirement is so broad that it may have no real
restraining effect on the grant of standing. However, it may be that a plaintiff may strengthen a case
for standing by providing evidence of commitment to the issue.
The case law does seem to present very few examples where lack of genuine interest has been
relied on to support a denial of standing, and a somewhat greater number where evidence of
commitment to an issue has been commented upon favourably in a decision to grant standing. In
Inshore Fishermen's Bonafiue Defense Fund Ass'n v. Canada (AG.) (1994), 130 N.S.R. (2d) 121
(S.C.) at 127, aff'd on other grounds (1994), 132 N.S.R. 370 (CA.), the court denied public interest
standing to a "new organization just getting off its feet, [which] represents only a small minority of
the total number of inshore fishermen." This was, however, only one of a number of grounds for
denying public interest standing. The court's most significant concern was that the action included a
claim for damages and would be procedurally very complex as a result. In Nova Scotia Music and
Amusement Operators Ass'n v. Nova Scotia (A.G.) (1992), 113 N.S.R. (2d) 54 (S.C.) [hereinafter
Nova Scotia Musk], an association of twelve amusement machine distributors was denied public
interest standing to challenge gambling machine regulations. The court held that the association, as
opposed to its members, was not directly affected by the regulations, and that its interest was not
"genuine" because it was public and humanitarian, but just a reflection of the financial interests of
its members. Predictably, a second action was brought by members of the association directly- H7-
FI Novelty Co. v.Nova Scotia (AG.) (1992), 121 N.S.R. (2d) 63 (S.C.), aff'd (1993), 126 N.S.R. (2d)
70 (CA) [hereinafter HI.FI Novelty]. On this occasion, the court found that the members were
either directly affected by or genuinely interested in the issues, because of the economic losses they
stood to suffer.
The plaintiff's previous involvement in the issues before the court was commented on
favourably in Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10 at 254, and in Canadian Civil Liberties
Ass'n v. Canada (A.G.) (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 609 (H.CJ.) at 617 [hereinafter Canadian Civil
Liberties]. In Grant v. Canada (AG.), [1995] 1 F.C. 158 at 195-96 (T.D.), the court granted public
interest standing to former R.C.M.P. officers and their relatives to challenge an R.C.M.P. policy
permitting the wearing of the Sikh turban with the R.C.M.P. uniform. The court commented that
the plaintiffs' interest was "at least equal" to that demonstrated in the Supreme Court of Canada
public interest standing cases and added that "the plaintiffs have also, to the extent that it is a
relevant consideration, involved themselves in the subject matter of the litigation."
39 Borowski #1, supra note 15 at 597. Martland J.'s summary did not set these out as three
issues, but subsequent commentary and case law have done so. See, for example, Cromwell, supra
note 19 at 86; and Hy and Zel's, supra note 11 at 690-92. Some commentators have divided the
issues differently, suggesting that persons who are directly affected need not show that there is no
other reasonable and effective manner to bring the issue to court. See H. Kushner, Case Comment
on Minister of Justice et aL v. Borowski (1983) 17 U.B.C. L. Rev. 143 at 152; and DJ. Mullan & AJ.
Roman, "Miister of.ustice of Canada v. Borowski: The Extent of the Citizen's Right to Litigate the
Lawfulness of Government Action" (1984) Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 303 at 351, dividing the issues
as follows: (a) serious issue of potential invalidity of legislation; (b) direct effect; or (c)(i) genuine
interest as citizens in the validity of the legislation, and (ii) no other reasonable and effective
manner in which the issue may be brought before the court. This division of the issues, however,
ignores the difference between direct effect relevant to the grant of discretionary public interest
standing and exceptional prejudice sufficient to obtain private standing as of right. See the
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Laskin C.J.C., dissenting in this case, wrote a judgment that
forecast the approach of the Supreme Court in Canadian Council of
Churches. He emphasized that public interest standing was exceptional,
and that generally persons could not attack legislation in the courts
unless they were "directly affected" or "threatened with sanctions for an
alleged violation."40 A plaintiff must show some "special interest in the
operation of the legislation beyond the general interest that is common
to all members of the relevant society."41 He cited as the rationale for
this policy a desire to confine the courts, generally speaking, to a
dispute-resolving role and to prevent dealing with questions that are not
sufficiently precise for judicial determination. Laskin C.J.C.'s major
concern appeared to be with controlling the way in which issues are
presented to the court, rather than limiting access. This would accord
with his position in Thorson.
Laskin C.J.C. would have denied standing because the
exculpatory provisions could be challenged by persons directly affected.
This class of potential plaintiffs included doctors and hospitals not
performing abortions or performing them under public pressure, who
wished to challenge the exculpatory aspects of the legislation. LaskinCJ.C. characterized their interest in the legislation as "more compelling
and immediate" and more worthy of judicial attention than Borowski's
"emotional response." 42 But he did not demonstrate that any such
litigation would be commenced, nor that it would result in the issue
before the court being any better defined or better presented.
The majority judgment also considered the possibility of
litigation by doctors or hospitals who did not perform abortions and held
that an attack by them would be no different than one by any other
concerned citizen. To replace Borowski with such a plaintiff would not
change the definition and factual context of the issues before the court.43
discussion, infa notes 96-97 and accompanying text regarding McNeil, supra note 28. It is also
inconsistent with the approach subsequently taken in Finlay, supra note 15; and in Hy and Zel's,
supra note 11.
4 0 Borowski #1, supra note 15.
411bid. at 578.
42 lbi at 585.
43 A concern with the definition and factual context of the legal issues followed Borowski's
litigation and eventually resulted in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that his case
became moot. By the time the case had been dealt with on the merits before the lower courts and
had returned to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Criminal Code provisions that Borowski
challenged had been struck down in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler
#1]. In Borowski #2, supra note 21, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the case had become
moot.
The purposes underlying the mootness doctrine are similar to those underlying the standing
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Therefore this would not be a more reasonable and effective form of
litigation than that already before the court. When one adds the
uncertainty as to whether such litigation would even be commenced, the
majority decision in favour of Borowski's standing seems well-founded.
The discretionary approach to public interest standing was
applied in an administrative law context in Finlay.4 4 In Finlay, a
recipient of provincial social assistance challenged the legality of federal
payments to Manitoba under the Canada Assistance Plan,45 argued that
Manitoba had not complied with conditions of federal cost-sharing
payments as provided by the Plan. The applicant sought standing on
either a private or public interest basis. Le Dain J., writing for the court,
first concluded that Finlay lacked private standing. Public interest
standing was considered as an alternative.
The court referred to policy considerations underlying standing
and identified aspects of the public interest standing test which met the
underlying concerns. Concerns relating to "the allocation of scarce
judicial resources and the need to screen out the mere busybody"46 were
answered when a serious issue and the plaintiff's genuine interest in the
issue were demonstrated. In other words, where there is a case to be
made that government action is unconstitutional or illegal, and where it
is brought by a plaintiff who is either privately interested or motivated by
a public concern about the legal issue, this is an appropriate use of
scarce judicial resources. The concern that "in the determination of
issues the courts should have the benefit of the contending points of view
of those most directly affected by them"47 was resolved when it appeared
that there was no other reasonable and effective manner in which the
issue might be litigated. This concern relates to the requirements of the
doctrine. The court is concerned with the efficient use of judicial resources, with the requirements
of the adversarial process, and with the justiciability and appropriateness for legal decision of the
issues before it. InBorowski #2, the court engaged in a purposive interpretation and application of
the mootness doctrine. Moot cases should be heard by the court provided the objectives of
mootness doctrine are met.
The most important factor in the court's finding that the issue in Borowski #2 had become
moot was the lack of definition of the issue. Formerly, the question of the constitutionality of the
Criminal Code provisions had offered a concrete issue, but with the disappearance of those
provisions, Borowski's argument became a general and unfocused one. The loss of the statutory
contest meant that the issue was no longer adequately specific to be suitable for judicial
determination. But Borowski #2 did not detract from the decision implicit in Borowski #1, ibid.,
that the constitutionality of a statutory provision may have adequate specificity for judicial
resolution, without any added factual context.
44 Supra note 15.
45 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1.
4 6 Finay, supra note 15 at 631.
4 7 1bU.
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adversarial process. The court assumed that there were advantages to
having directly affected parties as adversaries, although these advantages
are questionable.48 But these advantages were dispensable, in favour of
ensuring judicial review of the legality of government actions.
Finlay met each of the requirements of public interest standing.
He had a genuine interest in the issue as shown by his status as a person
in need who complained of having been prejudiced. This personal
interest, although insufficiently causally connected to the challenged
federal payments to give Finlay private standing, was nonetheless
relevant to demonstrate that he was "not a mere busybody."49 There
was also no other more effective way to bring the issue to court. The
consideration of this issue also returned to Finlay's interest. There was
no one with a more direct interest than his and therefore no one who
could have better presented the issue.
B. The Contraction of Public Interest Standing
1. Canadian Council of Churches
The contraction of the public interest standing test began with
Canadian Council of Churches.50 The Council, a public interest
organization, commenced an action challenging 81 provisions of the
amended Immigration ActSl as violating the Charter, and claimed public
interest standing to bring the suit. That the previously established
principles should govern public interest standing for declaratory actions
under the Charter was accepted without question. In the Supreme Court
of Canada, Cory J., writing for a unanimous court, noted that the
increasing recognition of the importance of public rights and the
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 confirmed the need for public
interest standing.
However, the court also expressed a preference for the
traditional mode of proceeding dealing with individuals. Cory J.
indicated that the "[o]ne great advantage of operating in the traditional
mode" is that "the courts can reach their decisions based on facts that
48 See the discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text, as to the "representativeness" of
privately interested parties.
49 Supra note 15 at 633.
50 Supra note 10.
51 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
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have been clearly established."5 2 One purpose of standing requirements,
that of providing a concrete factual context for the issues before the
court, was thus identified and aligned with traditional private standing.
However, the court did not go on to examine the application of standing
requirements in the case in view of that purpose. Rather, the court
asserted a general rule that traditional private litigation should have
preferential status as compared with that commenced by public interest
plaintiffs.
The control of access to scarce judicial resources was also heavily
emphasized. The need to devote judicial resources to traditional
litigation was relied on as a justification for limiting grants" of public
interest standing. The court's role as an adjudicator of private disputes
was described as "an important role in our society."53 To fulfil this, the
court must "ensure that judicial resources are not overextended."5 4 "It
would be disastrous if the courts were allowed to become helplessly
overburdened as a result of the unnecessary proliferation of marginal or
redundant suits brought by well-meaning organizations."55
The lack of availability of traditional litigation was established as
the signal test for the granting of public interest standing. The purpose
of public interest standing was "to prevent the immunization of
legislation or public acts from any challenge."5 6 Granting standing was
therefore not necessary and should not be granted when, "on a balance
of probabilities, it [could] be shown that the measure [would] be subject
to attack by a private litigant."57 The granting of public interest status
was, instead, limited to situations where "no directly affected individual
might be expected to initiate litigation."58
The change in attitude is striking. The strong focus on
protection of judicial resources against an unworthy flood of public
interest litigation reflects a fear that was dismissed in Thorson as
52 Supra note 10 at 249.
53 Ibid
54Ibd
55 Iid at 252.
56 Ibid while this reflects a basic rationale of Thorson, supra note 17, it does not account for
the more expansive approaches of McNeil, supra note 28, and Borowski #1, supra note 15, where the
court accepted reasonable and effective presentation of serious issues in the absence of
demonstrably better forms of litigation, but did not demand that the public interest plaintiff
demonstrate that there would otherwise be immunity from review.
5 7 Canadian Council of Churches, ibid.
581bU at 251.
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unrealistic. The restriction of public standing in order to preservejudicial resources for private plaintiffs amounts to an abandonment of
the perspective of Finlay, i. e., that the consideration of serious
constitutional or other public law issues presented by motivated litigants
is a proper use of court resources.
In attempting to understand the change in attitude in Canadian
Council of Churches, one is left to speculate whether the presence of an
organized public interest plaintiff, specifically noted by the court, could
be responsible for the rebirth of the fear of an onslaught of public
interest litigation. In assessing the requirements for public interest
standing, the court did find that the Canadian Council of Churches had a
genuine interest in the issues raised in the lawsuit. It had "the highest
possible reputation and ha[d] demonstrated a real and continuing
interest in the problems of the refugees and immigrants."59 So there was
no theoretical obstacle to the grant of public interest standing to a public
interest organization. The negative implications are more subtle. The
court implied that through its expansion of the role of the public interest
intervenor, it had adequately accommodated the interests of public
interest groups, and that it should not be expected to permit further
intrusions by such groups. 60 Although the role of intervenor is an
important one for public interest groups, it is an inherently limited one.
Intervenors can only address the issues raised by the parties to a private
lawsuit and may not introduce new issues.61
The court denied public interest standing to the Council because
there were other reasonable and effective means to bring the issues to
court. The Immigration Act was regulatory; it directly affected iefugee
claimants, who had private standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the amendments, and who "were bringing forward claims akin to those
brought by the Council on a daily basis."62 The case is distinguishable
from previous public interest standing cases because of this feature of
the existence of other litigation. If it were, however, limited to these
circumstances it would not constitute a significant drawback in public
interest standing doctrine.63 But the court's language suggests that the
5 9 Ibid. at 254.
60 Ibid. at 256. Public interest groups could contribute to the court process and convey their
own perspectives by obtaining intervenor status in private proceedings.
61 P v. Morgentaler, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 462 [hereinafterMortgentaler #2].
62 Supra note 10 at 254.
63 To similar effect, see Canadian Abortion Rights Action League Inc. (CA.RA.L) v. Nova
Scotia (AG.) (1990), 96 N.S.R. (2d) 284 at 293-95 (CA.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied (1990),
127 N.R. 158. See also R v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 at 470, wherein the court noted the
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mere existence of directly affected persons, even if they had not
commenced litigation, would be sufficient to bar public interest standing.
2. A Purposive Inquiry
Was the decision in Canadian Council of Churches justified by
the underlying purposes of standing? The court did not suggest that any
flood of inappropriate public rights litigation was actually occurring and
did not explain why it resurrected this fear, or why any flood could not
be controlled by less extreme methods than a barring of access to public
interest plaintiffs. Apart from the control of a hypothetical flood,
concerns about the economical use of judicial resources more likely
favour the use of a single reference-type procedure as commenced by
the Council, rather than a multitude of individual lawsuits.64
The court referred to its concern to ensure that legal issues are
determined in an adequate factual context. The result in Canadian
Council of Churches was consistent with the achievement of this
objective, but this was due to the significant difference in the public and
private litigation involved. The choice available to the court in the case
was between one action challenging in general terms 81 statutory
provisions, and many individual applications of specific provisions. The
distinction between these two forms of litigation was not just between
parties bringing the actions, but between vastly different ways of
presenting the questions: a generalized, reference-type procedure as
against specific contextualized disputes. The latter form of litigation can
clarify and bring into perspective the questions before the court.
The provision of an adequate factual context is a legitimate
concern, but it is not limited to actions commenced by public interest
plaintiffs. It is a concern that may equally apply in litigation involving
private rights. Declaratory actions can be brought by individuals with
private standing, as well as public interest plaintiffs, and, especially in a
Charter context, may not present a pertinent "concrete factual
background." Whether they do depends on the nature of the Charter
right or freedom relied on, the nature of the challenged law or other
government action, and/or on how the case is presented.
dismissal of C.A.R.A.L's claim for lack of standing "primarily because the same issues would be
determined in the present case."
6 4 Roach,supra note 15, para. 5.230.
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The existence of a plaintiff with private standing did not
guarantee a concrete factual background in Danson v. Ontario (A.G.).65
A lawyer sought a declaration that a court rule relating to the imposition
of costs against solicitors violated the Charter. The application was
brought without any factual context. The ensuing problems, which
resulted in dismissal of the application, were not related by the court to
the status of the applicant, but to the manner in which he chose to
present the issue. On the other hand, a plaintiff with public interest
standing may present a very specific and contextualized issue, as in
Cardozo v. Canada,66 in which public interest plaintiffs were permitted to
challenge a customs decision permitting the importation of racist pins.
Further, a concrete factual background is not always necessary.
In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.),67 a newspaper publisher
challenged the constitutionality of legislative provisions prohibiting the
media from publishing material in court documents. The publisher
brought a declaration application. There was no actual or threatened
prosecution, nor evidence of specific instances in which publication of
particular material was prohibited. The Supreme Court of Canada
considered the problems clear and significant on the face of the statute,
and the declaration issued.
Where there is a clear violation on the face of the statute, as the
court found in Edmonton Journal, it may be that no evidence of effect,
whether by way of specific applications or otherwise, is required. 8
Where evidence of effect is required, as it was in MacKay v.Manitoba,69
the most appropriate form of evidence may not be specific applications,
but statistical or other generally descriptive evidence. In that case,
general evidence about the effect of election legislation funding
formulas on new or fringe parties was required. The standing of the
plaintiff was not dealt with in MacKay. But even if the plaintiff were an
affected political party, this would give it an advantage only in presenting
evidence of one application of the statute. The presentation of evidence
about the general effect of a law obviously does not depend on the status
of the plaintiff. In a practical sense, it may be more likely that an
organized public plaintiff with expertise about the issue would have
65 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086 [hereinafter Danson]. The treatment of Danson's standing by the
court is discussed infra note 135.
66 (1993), 62 F.T.R. 55 [hereinafter Cardozo].
67 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [hereinafter Edmnonton Joumal].
68 See also Danson, supra note 65 at 1100-01.
69 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 [hereinafter MacKay].
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better access to such evidence. This supports the position that a lack of
evidence should be addressed directly, rather than through the use of
standing rules. 70
The preference in Canadian Council of Churches for private
litigation should not be applied where there is a choice between a public
interest plaintiff and a private plaintiff bringing an action that does not
present a pertinent concrete factual background. In such circumstances
there is no advantage to "private" litigation. It is not a more effective
way to bring the issue to court.71 If the public interest plaintiff has some
form of expertise that the private plaintiff does not, the litigation might
even be less effective.
This distinction was drawn in a decision of the Alberta Queen's
Bench: Board of Trustees of St. Paul Public School Dist. v. Alberta
(Minister of Education).72 Public interest standing was claimed by a
number of public school districts which claimed that the educational
funding system discriminated against taxpayers and students in rural,
70 As was done in MacKay, ibid., and Danson, supra note 65; and as was advocated by Ontario
Law Reform Commission, supra note 15 at 57-58, and Cromwell, supra note 19 at 173.
71 This approach is consistent with that adopted in Borowski #1, supra note 15, as discussed
supra note 43 and accompanying text. It is arguably also supported by Conseil du Patronat du
Qudbec Inc. v. Quebec (AG.), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 685, rev'g (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 523 (Que. CA.)
[hereinafter Conseil du Patronat]. In this decision, delivered less than two months before the
Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed agreement
with the dissenting decision of Chouinard JA., who had granted public interest standing to an
association of Quebec employers formed to represent their interest by challenging anti-strike-
breaking legislation under the Charter. The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal had held that
the association, because it did not itself have unionized employees, should be denied public interest
standing as actions could be brought by employers of unionized employees who were directly
interested in the law, either in declaratory proceedings or in regulatory proceedings arising from a
strike. Chouinard J.A., in the judgment adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada, held that the
association should be treated as having the same interests as its members, and that, in any event, a
direct interest was not a requirement of public interest standing. Further, the possibility of actions
by such employers did not operate to deny standing to the association. Although the decision is
inconsistent with the doctrine as described in Canadian Council of Churches, the case can be
distinguished. Firstly, no regulatory actions had been commenced. Secondly, given the time
constraints and pressures involved where a strike is ongoing, regulatory proceedings might not be a
very satisfactory means of access to the court for consideration of the constitutional issue. (The
problems would be somewhat analogous to those considered in Borowski #1 regarding an action by
a potential father see supra note 36 and accompanying text.) The available means of access to the
court would thus be declaratory applications brought by either the association or affected
employers, and there was nothing to suggest that the latter would be any more reasonable or
effective than the former. For a discussion and contrasting of the approaches in the Conseil du
Patronat and Canadian Council of Churches decisions, see also D.F. Bur & J.K. Kehoe,
"Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1991-92 Term" (1993) 4 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 49 at
62-71.
72 (3 February 1993), Calgary 9201-03921 (Alta. Q.B.).
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"poorer" schbol districts. The court found that the test for public
interest standing was not met because no reasonable cause of action was
alleged. Nonetheless, the court went on to deal with the remaining parts
of the public interest standing test. With regard to the third part of the
test, it was argued that taxpayers and students would have direct
interests and could sue. These individuals presumably would bring
declaratory actions. Students were not directly regulated by the funding
provisions so they could not do otherwise. Taxpayers could resist
assessment, but even this would not increase the "concrete factual
background" because there would be nothing individual about the
application of the law or their complaint. The complaint made in the
action was general in nature, relating to the overall impact of the system
of funding. Justice McMahon held that the Canadian Council of
Churches test required not simply that other affected persons could sue,
but that such suits should be "a reasonable and effective manner to bring
the issue forward."73 In this case, he held, suits by students and
taxpayers "raising this constitutional challenge to a funding scheme to
which they are mere intended beneficiaries and not parties; about which
they would know little; and which they neither administer nor operate
within"74 would not be an effective form of litigation.75
73 Ibi at 25 [emphasis in original].
74 1bid
75 1bid. No such consideration of the comparative effectiveness of various forms of action was
undertaken in Nova Scotia Music, supra note 38, or in its successor litigation, HI-F Novelty, supra
note 38. The first action was brought by an association of twelve amusement machine distributors
challenging the constitutionality of provincial gambling regulations applicable to licensed premises.
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court denied the association public interest standing on the basis that
the association was not directly affected by the regulations, although its members might be, and
added that its interest was not "genuine" because it was not public and humanitarian, but instead a
reflection of the financial interests of its members. Predictably, the second action was brought by
members of the association directly. Again public interest standing was denied. One ground was
that the requirement of a serious issue was not met. However, the court also held that it would be
more reasonable and effective to have the action brought by the proprietors of licensed premises
who were directly regulated by the legislation. The chambers judgment did not indicate whether a
declaratory action or regulatory proceeding was contemplated, although the Court of Appeal, in
upholding the judgment, contemplated a regulatory proceeding. Even if a regulatory proceeding
were involved, it is unlikely that this would provide a factual picture in any way pertinent to the issue
of provincial jurisdiction to regulate gambling. The interests of the adversarial system would not be
better served in a regulatory proceeding. It is also submitted that the interests of judicial economy
were not well served by the successive decision addressed to standing. Dealing with the seriousness
of the issue or with the merits resolves the matter conclusively and is, therefore, a more efficient use
of court resources.
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3. Hy and Zel's
A restrictive approach to public interest standing was continued
in Hy and Zel's.76 Two corporations, against whom penal proceedings
under Sunday closing legislation had been commenced, sought public
interest standing in civil applications for declarations that the law
violated sections 2(a) and 15 of the Charter. These corporations clearly
possessed private standing in the traditional sense.T7 They sought public
interest standing because of the development in Irwin ToyTS of a rule that
denied private litigants in civil proceedings the right to rely on the
Charter rights of others. The result is ironic: while the court indicated in
Canadian Council of Churches that private actions are the preferred
route for Charter challenges, the Irwin Toy rule imposed significant
restrictions on the nature of Charter arguments that can be made by
private applicants. These restrictions do not apply to the public interest
applicant. This gives the distinction between private and public interest
standing additional importance, and compels persons with private
standing to seek public interest standing.79
76 Supra note 11.
77 Smith, supra note 14, discussed below in Part IV(A).
78 Supra note 5, discussed injfa notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
79 The majority in Hy and Zel's, supra note 11 at 690, commented that the parties did not
present evidence pertaining to private standing and indicated that the public interest standing test
must be met "where, as in the present case, the party does not claim a breach of its own rights under
the Charter but those of others."
In lower court decisions prior to Hy and Zel's, corporate parties with private standing had
successfully sought public interest standing in order to be permitted to rely on the Charter rights of
others. In Canadian BarAss'n v. British Columbia (AG.) (1993), 101 D.LR. (4th) 410 (B.C.S.C.),
the private standing of the Bar Association and the Law Society as plaintiffs had been admitted on
the basis that they would become liable to pay a challenged tax to their own counsel in the subject
proceeding. It was also conceded that they could raise division of powers arguments, but not an
argument under section 7 of the Charter because of their corporate status. The petitioners rejected
the conceded basis for standing and claimed that they satisfied the requirements for public interest
standing. The court held that they did satisfy those requirements and that, because they had public
interest standing, they were not limited to their own constitutional rights.
InAntrim Yards Ltd v. Canada, [1991] 3 F.C. 459 at 477 (T.D.) [hereinafter Antim Yards], a
corporation, which suffered financial loss arising from a law which it sought to challenge under
section 15 of the Charter, was granted public interest standing. Strayer J. indicated that the only
other means of bringing the issue to court would be through enforcement of taxes due or
prosecution for failure to pay, and that he did "not understand the jurisprudence on standing to
seek declarations of invalidity to require plaintiffs to wait until they [were] sued or prosecuted to
impugn the statute under which such charges might be laid."
Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island (Mister of Health and Social Services) (1994), 117 Nfld. &
P.E.I.1. 181 (P.E.L T.D.), was decided after Hy and Zel's, but does not refer to it. Dr. Morgentaler,
whose abortion clinics provide services for women from P.E.I, was granted pubic interest standing
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In the lower court decisions in Hy and Zels,80 the declaration
applications were dismissed on the merits.8 1 In the Supreme Court of
Canada a majority of the court, in a judgment written by Major J., held
that neither the corporations nor their employees (who had joined the
applications as applicants) had standing to bring the declaration
applications.8 2 The court was prepared to assume that a serious issue
was raised, and held that the liability to prosecution of both retailers and
their employees meant that they were directly affected by the legislation.
But public interest standing was denied because there were other
reasonable means of bringing the constitutional issues before the court.
What were the other means? In Canadian Council of Churches, the
court complained of the plaintiff's lack of a private interest. A private
interest was plainly in existence in Hy and Zel's. But the court still found
that there were other preferable ways to litigate.
In previous public interest standing cases, the other means of
access to the courts involved other persons. In Hy and Zel's, the other
means of access included criminal enforcement proceedings against the
same parties. The interest that caused the parties to be directly affected
did not support their claim for standing, as had occurred in McNeil and
Finlay, rather it created an alternative means of access to the courts and
so operated to deny them public interest standing.8 3  Criminal
to bring a challenge to P.E.L policy regarding payment for abortions. The challenge was, however,
based on administrative law grounds, not on the Charter.
80 The lower court decisions were unreported, but are described in the Supreme Court of
Canada decision. The previous proceedings in Hy and Zel's companion case, Paul Magder Furs,
supra note 11, are complicated by issues relating to contempt of court arising from violations of
interim orders, and are also reviewed by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. at 695-96, and Major J. at 684-87.
81 The courts held that the constitutional issues had been determined in Peel (Regional
Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1991), 2 O.R. (3d) 65 (CA) [hereinafter
Peel]. Peel was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, but had not been heard prior to the
hearing in Hy and Zel's, supra note 11, and was discontinued prior to the judgment in Hy and Zel's
leave to appeal granted sub nor. Oshawa Group Ltd. v. Ontario (AG.), [1991] 3 S.C.R. x; notice of
discontinuance of appeal filed 31 August 1993, S.C.C. Bulletin at 1493.
82 Lamer CJ., La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and lacobucci JJ. concurring. L'Heureux-
Dub6 J. wrote the dissenting judgment, with McLachlin J. concurring.
83 This aspect of the decision is not really concerned with the entitlement to bring a
proceeding, but with the form of action. The use of a civil declaratory action as an alternative to
criminal proceedings was considered in Kourtesss v. M.N.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53 [hereinafter
Kowussis]. To some extent the court demonstrated the virtue of consistency in that one test applied
to determine the availability of a civil action was stated to be whether other reasonable means of
access to the court existed. Generally, a declaratory action should not be used as a substitute for a
trial ruling in a criminal case. But in Hy and Zel's, supra note 11, no procedural issues, such as
appeal rights or the fragmentation of trials, arose as a result of the declaratory action. The nature
of the constitutional challenge presented in the criminal and civil proceedings was identical. The
declaratory action possessed an advantage in that it also invoked the interests of employees who,
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proceedings would not present the constitutional issues in any different
way. They would not add any pertinent factual background or have
other procedural advantages. Why they should be characterized as a
more reasonable and effective means to litigate the issue is not apparent
and was not explained by the court.
Another means of bringing the Charter issue to court, referred to
by the majority, was a constitutional challenge by parties claiming that
their own religious rights were violated. Thus the court's preference was
not just for parties who were directly affected, but parties who were
directly affected by the constitutional rights raised in the case. Any
direct effect, certainly the potential imposition of fines or other
penalties, should be sufficient to provide a motivated adversary. But
parties whose constitutional rights are directly affected offer further
advantages. A constitutional challenge by such parties provides some
assurance that the Charter interests are represented in the hearing.8 4
Further, such a challenge may provide a concrete factual background
pertinent to the Charter issues involved. Where it is available, this type
of challenge may well provide the ideal presentation of a constitutional
issue. However, the likelihood of such an ideal presentation actually
occurring must also be considered. In this case, unlike Canadian Council
of Churches, there was no reference to any such litigation actually
commenced. Practical obstacles to such litigation were not addressed.
For example, while the Charter rights of employees may be affected by
Sunday closing laws, the employees are unlikely to have the political or
financial resources to bring their concerns to courtj65
The majority also expressed a concern with the paucity of the
factual record in the case. The facts pertaining to the parties' interests
were clear, however, and the court had in previous cases considered the
issue of other reasonable means of access by reviewing the terms of the
challenged laws. The lack of evidence would appear to be relevant to
the merits of the case. One would expect, on this basis, that the case
would be lost on the merits, or dismissed because of inadequate
evidence as occurred in Danson and MacKay, and not because of a
denial of standing.
while subject to being charged, had not been charged. Further, the action had already proceeded to
the Supreme Court of Canada. In these circumstances it seemed unreasonable to deny the parties
their chosen procedure.
84 Subject to caveats that mirror those relating to the "representativeness" of parties with
traditional private interests, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. The individuals involved are
not selected for their representative abilities. Further, the lack of representation of an interest may
be remedied by way of a grant of intervenor status to an appropriate representative.
85 As discussed by L'Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting in Hy and Zel's, supra note 11 at 722.
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L'Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting, held that the appellants had
private standing. This, however, would have been a barren form of
standing, if the Invin Toy principle denied them the ability to rely on
section 2(a) or section 15 of the Charter. She resolved this issue by
departing from the rule in Irwin Toy and by finding that the test for
public interest standing, applied flexibly and purposively, was met. She
considered the traditional justifications for limiting standing and
demonstrated that they were not served by a denial of standing. In fact,
judicial economy would have been better served, and a multiplicity of
proceedings avoided, by granting standing, as it was clear that the penal
proceedings against the corporations would continue and the Charter
issues would eventually have to be dealt with by the court.
4. Conclusion
The Hy and Zel's decision did not further the objectives
underlying standing rules in any explicable way. The application of the
public interest standing test in the majority judgment was done without
reference to those purposes. The denial of standing simply because the
constitutional challenge could have been brought in a different format or
conceivably might be brought by someone else in the future, without a
demonstration of the advancement of these objectives, is an
unproductive use of the doctrine of public interest standing. The
marked lack of concern for the apparently serious issue presented in the
case contributes to the appearance that the court was evading the merits.
The restrictive approach to public interest standing in Canadian
Council of Churches and Hy and Zel's leads to a dismal forecast
regarding the importance of public interest standing in future Charter
litigation. The mere existence of persons whose rights and freedoms
may be affected by a challenged law, without a demonstration that
litigation has been or is sure to be commenced by such individuals, or
that such litigation would more effectively present the constitutional
issue, operates to bar public interest standing. If the Supreme Court of
Canada continues with this approach, it seems that public interest
standing law will return to its pre-McNeil stage of development and will
be available to challenge declaratory legislation only. Regulatory
legislation may be subject to challenge only by those regulated, and only
if their own Charter rights and freedoms have been infringed.
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IV. PRIVATE STANDING
A. Origin of the Traditional Rule
The test for private standing to challenge the violation of a
public right dates back to Smith.8 6 Smith, an Ontario resident, ordered
liquor from a Montreal dealer. The dealer refused to fill his order
because of the implementation in Ontario of the Canada Temperance
Act.87 Smith brought a declaratory action, arguing that the order in
council bringing into force the federal legislation was invalid. The court
held that he lacked status to sue.88 The difficulties posed by the denial
of standing were admirably stated by Duff J. (as he then was), but were
ignored because of "grave inconvenience" that could flow from a grant
of standing:
Much may be said, no doubt, for the view that an individual in the position of the
appellant ought, without subjecting himself to a prosecution for a criminal offence, to
have some means of raising the question of the legality of official acts imposing constraint
upon him in his daily conduct which, on grounds not unreasonable, he thinks are
unauthorized and illegal. We think however, that to accede to appellant's contention
upon this point would involve the consequence that virtually every resident of Ontario
could maintain a similar action. ... We think the recognition of such a principle would
lead to grave inconvenience ... .89
In order to avoid this grave inconvenience the court adopted the
test of private standing found in public nuisance cases. The Smith case
has been taken to establish that plaintiffs in declaratory actions,
challenging laws on constitutional grounds, must show exceptional
prejudice arising from, or a special interest in, the challenged law.90 The
major rationale for this standing requirement, offered in the public
nuisance cases, was that the role of safeguarding public rights was
entrusted to the Attorney General, not to private citizens. Transferring
86 Supra note 14.
8 7 S.C. 1920, c. 8.
88 Supra note 14. Duff ., with Maclean . concurring, and Mignault . indicated that Smith
lacked status to sue, but nonetheless went on to deal with the merits of the case because of some
doubt on this point and because of the importance of the issue. Idington . dismissed the case as
raising a hypothetical question: see the discussion, infra note 93 and accompanying text, and see the
commentary infra note 163.
89 IbU at 337.
90 bid. These terms were employed respectively by Duff J. at 337, and Mignault . at 347.
They derive from the requirement for standing in cases of public nuisance; see, generally, Cromwell,
supra note 19 at 24-27. On the characterization of Smith in the case law, see Cromwell at 74-75.
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this rationale to the constitutional context is questionable, as the role of
the Attorney General focuses on enforcing duly enacted legislation, not
challenging its constitutionality.91 Despite this and other criticisms,
Smith's authority was unchallenged until Thorson, and at least until the
Hy and Zel's decision, it was regarded as an authoritative statement of
the requirements of private standing.92
The reasoning in Smith, however, relied as much on the
hypothetical or speculative nature of the case, as on the nature of
Smith's interest in the subject of the suit. Smith was not permitted to
seek a declaration because no claims had been made against him nor
had prosecution been commenced or threatened.93 According to this
approach, it was more a matter of Smith's timing, rather than his
interest, that was of concern.
The Smith decision reflected both of the basic concerns of
standing rules. There was a desire to protect court resources, and a
concern to ensure that issues had crystallized adequately so as to be
appropriate for legal determination. But these concerns were not
properly explored. The fear of a flood of public rights litigation was not
a reasonable one. There was no other analysis relating to whether the
case would utilize court resources efficiently (for example, by
determining an issue that might arise in multiple penal proceedings). A
consideration of the issue raised, and of the factual context presented by
Smith, indicates that the issue had crystallized and that it would not be
better defined or presented by awaiting prosecution.
B. Indications For andAgainst Liberalization of the Rule
The public interest standing cases of the Supreme Court of
Canada also considered the requirements of private standing. In
Thorson, Laskin J. (as he then was), in the majority decision, indicated
that the correctness of Smith
91 Thorson, supra note 17 at 146-47; Cromwell, ib. at 77; and Hogg, supra note 20 at 1265-66.
92 Hogg, ibid. at 1265; and Roach, supra note 15, paras. 5.310-5.320.
93 Supra note 14. See the judgment of Idington J. at 333 and Duff J. at 336, distinguishing
Dyson v.AG., [1911] 1 KB. 410 on this basis. See also Cromwell, supra note 19 at 72. This aspect
of the decision is also subject to criticism, as discussed infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
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might be put in doubt if it be taken to hold that the amended Canada Temperance Act
was immune from challenge by a declaratory action at the suit of either Smith or the
Montreal firm which refused, because of the amended legislation, to fill Smith's liquor
order and hence brought to a halt a proposed business relationship.9 4
He repeated the question raised in Smith, wondering why a plaintiff
should not be qualified in a declaratory action, but be compelled to
violate the statute and risk prosecution. He did not overrule Smith, but
seemed to be criticizing Smith's overly restrictive interpretation of
"exceptional prejudice." Thomas Cromwell suggested, accordingly, that
the halting of a proposed business relationship may be a sufficient basis
for private standing.95
McNeil also raised questions about the authority of Smith. The
case was treated by the court as a case of public interest standing. The
court considered other factors, such as the means to bring the issue to
court in granting discretionary public interest standing, rather than
finding that the Smith test for private standing had been met. The direct
effect or real stake of McNeil supported the court's exercise of its
discretion to grant public interest standing, but apparently was not
sufficient to give him private standing as of right. This creates a
distinction between the exceptional prejudice necessary for private
standing and the direct effect which supports a discretionary grant of
public interest standing. It seems unlikely that such a fine distinction
can be satisfactorily drawn, given the vagueness of the concepts
involved.9 6 Thomas Cromwell has suggested that it would be more
satisfactory to say that McNeil met the Smith test for private standing.97
Post-Charter, if McNeil based his action on his constitutional right to
view films, Strayer has suggested that his case for private standing would
seem to be stronger.98
While Thorson and McNeil provided some support for a more
expansive approach to private standing, Laskin C.J.C., dissenting in
Borowski #1 and referring to a statement accepted by the majority in
Finlay, supported a more restrictive approach. Laskin CJ.C.
emphasized that public interest standing was exceptional, and that
generally persons could not attack legislation in the courts unless they
9 4 Supra note 17 at 148.
95 Supra note 19 at 81.
96 See D. Mullan, "Standing After McNeil" (1976) 8 Ottawa L Rev. 32 at 41-42.
9 7 Supra note 19 at 82.
98 Supra note 17 at 156.
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were "directly affected" or "threatened with sanctions for an alleged
violation."9 9 A plaintiff must show some
special interest in the operation of the legislation beyond the general interest that is common
to all members of the relevant society. This is especially true of the criminal law. For
example, however passionately a person may believe that it is wrong to provide for
compulsory breathalyzer tests or wrong to make mere possession of marijuana an offence
... the courts are not open to such a believer, not himself or herself charged or even
threatened with a charge, to seek a declaration against the enforcement of such criminal
laws.100 [emphasis added]
The exact boundaries of private standing remain unclear. This is
in part because, in difficult cases such as Finlay, the courts have relied in
the alternative on public interest standing. Further, in the Charter
context, traditional private standing was rendered barren by the Irwin
Toy rule, which will be discussed below.
C. A New Restriction on Standing
1. Irwin Toy
A very significant restriction on private standing developed in
another line of cases. Initially, this was not described as a restriction on
standing, but as a restriction on the Charter rights or freedoms that
might be relied upon by a party. The resulting threshold rule operated
in essentially the same way as a standing rule. It depended on the
relationship of the party to the issues sought to be litigated, and meant
that the court would not consider the merits of those issues.
The argument that reliance on the Charter rights of others should
be prohibited first arose in Big M.1o In this penal proceeding against a
99 Borowski #1, supra note 15 at 578.
100 Tbid at 578-79, Laskin CJ.C. dissenting. The emphasized portion was quoted without
exception by Le Dain J. for the court in Finlay, supra note 15 at 621, in his discussion of the
requirements for private standing. The judgment also referred to a number of other statements of
the nature of the required private right or special damage, without adopting any specific formula.
Finlay did not have private standing because of a lack of a nexus or causal connection between the
prejudice he suffered and the federal payments he was challenging. In adopting from American
law, this elaboration on the nature of the required private right or special damage, and especially in
finding on a preliminary application that a nexus could not be established, the court was taking
quite a restrictive approach to private standing: see J.M. Evans, "Developments in Administrative
Law:. The 1986-87 Term" (1988) 10 Supreme Court L.R. 1 at 17; and Bogart, supra note 26 at 386.
101 Supra note 7.
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corporate accused under the Lords Day Act,102 an objection was raised
that the corporation should not be able to rely on section 2(a) of the
Charter as it itself had no religion. The Supreme Court of Canada
responded that an accused could raise any constitutional defect in a law
under which it was charged-that the constitutionality of the law, not the
particular rights of the accused, was the more important concern. The
import of the decision was that established standing law would apply to
cases seeking to hold legislation invalid because of conflict with the
Charter. In these cases, section 24 of the Charter was superfluous. The
court relied upon the traditional power of judicial review now reflected
in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The more restrictive standing
rule referred to in section 24 did not supplant established procedure.
The Big M principle is still followed, but it has been limited to
penal proceedings only. In civil actions, whether declaratory or for other
forms of relief, the court has determined that applicants or plaintiffs
with private standing are not permitted to rely on the Charter rights of
others. In effect, the section 24 rule applies, even if the plaintiff or
applicant seeks only section 52 relief. The rule applicable to civil
proceedings was first established in Irwin Toy.103 This was a declaratory
action by a corporation which was permitted to argue the violation of its
own freedom of expression and a division of powers issue. However, the
corporation was not permitted to rely upon the Charter rights of others
found in section 7. The Big M principle was held to be inapplicable, as
no penal proceedings were pending in the case and the principle did not
apply to a civil declaratory action. 104
2. Hy and Zel's
The majority decision in Hy and Zel's purported not to deal with
private standing,10s but in fact adopted the Irwin Toy rule as a rule of
standing for a Charter declaratory application. Unless discretionary
102 Supra note 9.
103 Supra note 5.
104 Ibid. at 1004. In Dywidag Systems International, Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers
Construction Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 705 [hereinafter Dywidag Systems], a civil action for damages in
which the constitutionality of the Federal CourtAct, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, ss. 17(1) and (2),
was in issue, the Supreme Court again refused to allow a corporation to rely on section 7 rights,
again holding that BigM did not apply to the civil action.
105 Major J. for the majority stated that it was "not the proper case for deciding the extent to
which Smith survives in view of the more liberal views relating to public interest standing:" supra
note 11 at 694.
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public interest standing is granted, an applicant now needs to show not
only special prejudice, but that his or her Charter rights are affected.
This rule was applied to individuals as well as corporations. The failure
of the employee appellants in Hy and Zel's to provide evidence of effects
on their own religious freedom or equality meant that they, too, were
denied standing. Further, public interest standing will usually not be
available as a means to circumvent the restrictive standing rule.
Plaintiffs who are subject to prosecution must raise their constitutional
objections in the criminal proceeding. If private rights are affected in a
civil context, this option is not available,106 but public interest standing
could still be denied on the basis that plaintiffs whose Charter rights are
directly involved might come forward.
Peter Hogg has argued,107 and the dissenting judges in Hy and
Zel'slO8 agreed, that the Irwin Toy rule is irrational. Just as federalism
issues can be argued by private plaintiffs, so should all Charter issues,
regardless of personal application109 In some cases, a refusal to
consider the constitutional rights of others may support the underlying
principle that Charter cases should be decided against concrete factual
backgrounds. But unthinking application of the prohibition against
raising the Charter rights of others can also frustrate the underlying
concern with concrete factual backgrounds, and can result in
unnecessary bars to access to the court, 'that waste, rather than preserve
judicial resources11
1 06 Dywidag Systems, supra note 104.
1 07 Supra note 20 at 1269-74.
1 08 Supra note 11 at 713-16per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
109 See also W.A. Bogart, "Standing and the Charter: Rights and Identity" in Sharpe, ed.,
supra note 23, 1 at 23, arguing that concerns about corporate Charter actions should not be dealt
with by strict standing rules. Roach, supra note 15, paras. 5.350-5.360, argues that the Invin Toy
approach is preferable, and that the Big Mrule should not be expanded. Rather, he suggests that
parties seeking to rely on the Charter rights of others should satisfy the requirements for a
discretionary grant of public interest standing. He cites Antim Yards, supra note 79, a case which
predated Hy and Zel's, ibid., as an example of this approach. If entitlement to public interest
standing were determined generously and purposively, as per L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in the dissent in
Hy and Zel's, this approach would offer the court a tool to ensure that the case is permitted to
proceed only if the Charter interests will be argued in a full and competent manner, which is Roach's
concern. But with the restrictive approach to public interest standing shown by the majority, the
more likely result is a denial of public interest standing.
110 L'Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting in Hy and Zel's, ibid., argued persuasively that this was the
result of the majority's denial of standing. The case had already proceeded to the Supreme Court of
Canada, with the lower courts having determined the issue on the merits. Criminal proceedings had
been adjourned pending the result in the declaration application. The denial of standing simply
meant that the case would begin anew.
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3. A Purposive Inquiry
As a rule of standing, the Irwin Toy rule should be examined in
terms of the purposes underlying standing requirements. This was not
attempted in the cases establishing the rule; in Irwin Toy and Dywidag
Systems, the court simply declined to "extend" the Big M rule to civil
actions.111 This task was, however, undertaken in relation to the
standing of the applicants in Hy and Zel's, per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s
dissenting decision. She held that interests in judicial economy would be
served by allowing standing: the parties would not be otherwise
uninvolved as they had to deal with these issues. The case could
determine the outcome in numerous outstanding penal proceedings.
Further, the requirements of the adversarial system would be served
because the court would have before it a "live controversy" involving
"[t]he parties most directly affected by the Act."112 As discussed with
regard to the public interest standing ruling in the case, it cannot be
objected that these parties would be insufficiently motivated. However,
the characterization of the parties as directly affected by the legislation
somewhat begs the point made by the majority, that they are not directly
affected by the Charter rights relied on. Because of this, the soporate
applicants may not be the best representatives of religious freedom, and
the factual context may be inadequate. If parties directly affected in
both senses had commenced litigation, these concerns might be better
refusal to permit reliance on third party rights occurred in Dahlem (Guardian ad litem of) v. Thore
(1994), 2 E.T.R. (2d) 300 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Dahlem]. The recipients of a gift from a person
certified as a patient (pursuant to the Patients Property Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 313, s. 20), against
whom the Public Trustee had commenced an action to set a gift aside, were held to lack standing to
challenge the validity of the Act under the Charter. Their own constitutional rights were unaffected
and their personal financial interest was not a public interest as to the rights of patients or potential
patients. They were, therefore, held not to have public interest standing.
The implication of the decision is that a public interest group representing patients or
potential patients bringing a declaratory action would be in a better position to bring the issue to
court. Contrary to Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10, this would prefer a general
declaratory suit without a concrete factual background over the concrete factual background
presented in the case. This was not a case in which reliance on third party rights would involve a
lack of such a background, for the patient's constitutional interest in being treated as competent to
make a gift was simply the other side of a transaction directly involving the recipient who sought to
raise it. Just as speakers can refer to both listeners' rights and the press regarding the public right to
receive information (even in declaratory actions such as Irwin Toy, supra note 5 and Edmonton
111 Irwin Toy, ibid. at 1004; and Dywidag Systems, supra note 104 at 708-09. Roach, supra note
15, para. 5.355, adopts this language, speaking of the Big M rule as the exception, although it is
simply an application to the Charter of the private standing rule in Smith, supra note 14.
112 Supra note 11 at 718.
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served. 1 3 But the fact that such litigation might be preferable should
not bar standing in less than ideal litigation, where the ideal suit has not
been and, for practical reasons, may not be commenced.
In my view, it is unnecessary and unfortunate to bar Charter
litigation by parties with traditional private interests. Charter litigation
presents even greater than usual financial cost. Often, only those who
suffer equivalent or greater financial losses may be willing to put this
kind of personal investment into the determination of a public issue.
The fact that there are personal benefits to the parties does not detract
from the potential public benefit of the decisionJ14 The Sunday closing
cases prior to Hy and Zel's provide examples.1 15 The parties' personal
interests did not prevent the courts from analyzing the public impact of
the issues.116 These were quasi-criminal cases governed by the Big M
standing rule, but there is no reason why a court could not equally
determine public issues in private civil suits. It is also not clear that the
issues would have reached the courts otherwise. The affected religious
groups are diverse and geographically scattered. Regulations now exist
at federal, provincial, and municipal levels. These factors would make a
public interest case difficult to organize and fund.
The results in the Sunday closing cases may be challenged, but
this should be done directly. If the Supreme Court of Canada has set up
unduly restrictive standards for Sunday closing laws, then its approach to
the meaning of section 2(a) or the application of section 1 should be
re-examined. Avoidance of these issues through the use of standing
113 This would not be true in all cases. Sometimes the factual context will be identical; for
example, where there is a close relationship between the party with a traditional private interest and
the person or persons whose Charter right is affected. See the examples referred to, including
Dahemr, supra note 110. Further, the court may find that it can resolve representational issues by
allowing intervention.
However, because there may be cases in which litigation will be preferably presented by parties
more closely connected to the Charter interests, and in which such litigation either has been or will
clearly be undertaken, the approach adopted by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Hy and Zel's, ibid., and
advocated by Roach, supra note 15, as discussed supra note 107, seems to be the best one. This
involves treating the standing of persons with traditional private standing as discretionary and
subject to similar considerations as public interest standing.
114 Gibson, supra note 3 at 449, discusses the incidental benefits to disadvantaged individuals
arising from Charter challenges brought by corporations and advantaged individuals.
115 Big M, supra note 7; EdwardsRooks, supra note 5.
116 With regard to the impact of Charter litigation relating to Sunday closing laws, see M.
Brundrett, "Demythologizing Sunday Shopping: Sunday Retail Restrictions and the Charter" (1992)
50 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1. He argues that economically motivated litigation has lent an air of unreality
to the claims for religious freedom, but nonetheless supports one result of the litigation, which has
been to require (either judicial or legislative) accommodation of minority religious retailers.
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rules does not resolve them. They remain to be dealt with on another
occasion.
D. Distinguishing Standing and Remedy
A distinct issue arises as to the appropriate remedy in a Charter
case. Should a remedy benefit persons whose own Charter rights are not
affected?117 The answer must be that this will be merited in some cases,
because of the policy concerns that affect the court's choice of an
appropriate remedy. The court must consider the implications of
striking down a law or tailoring a more specific remedy. 18 The concerns
that guide the court in selecting an appropriate remedy are distinct from
those underlying standing.
The choice of an appropriate remedy was addressed in Schachter.
While the case dealt with remedies to extend benefits provided in
underinclusive laws, the court indicated that the remedy of reading down
a law to exclude unconstitutional applications was also available under
117 See on this point, C. Tollefson, Case Comment on R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1992)
71 Can. Bar Rev. 369 at 378, who argues that while a corporate accused may well have a "stake or
interest in the validity of the charging law sufficient to give rise to standing to allege its
unconstitutionality," the court should not automatically strike out laws that violate the Charter rights
of individuals, thus providing an incidental benefit to corporate accused. Rather, the court should
consider the American "as applied" approach (at 379) to constitutional validity and should develop
a "nuanced approach to remedial possibilities ... responsive to the distinctions between corporate
and individual rights claimants" (at 382-83). In the case, Lamer CJ.C. for the majority, held that a
law which applied to corporations and human persons, and violated the section 7 rights of the latter
only, was of no force and effect under section 52(1) of the Constitution Ac4 1982, supra note 13.
The fact that corporations would receive an incidental benefit was not a sufficient reason to alter
the court's usual approach to section 52(1): R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154
[hereinafter Wholesale Travel]. The Wholesale Travel case predated Schachter, supra note 13, which
signalled a more flexible approach to remedies as discussed below.
118 Tailoring an appropriate remedy can be done by reading down a law under section 52 or
by providing a constitutional exemption under section 24; Roach, supra note 15, paras. 14.170-
14.890, discusses these alternatives, noting their similar effect at para. 14.570. For reading down,
see Schachter, supra note 13. For constitutional exemption, see Rodriguez, supra note 6 at 571-80,
per Lamer CJ.C. in dissent.
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section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.119 The majority judgment
provided general guidelines as to the choice of remedial alternatives.
The manner in which the section I test has been failed is critical
to the determination of the appropriate remedy. If the purpose of the
law is inadequate, generally the law should be struck down entirely.12 0 A
similar result would follow if the law lacks a rational connection with its
purpose.121
On the other hand, where a law passes the objective and rational
connection tests, but fails the minimal impairment or effects tests under
section 1, there is more flexibility in defining the extent of the
inconsistency and the appropriate remedy. In choosing a remedy that
has the effect of narrowing the application of a law, the court must
1 19 Schachter, ibid. at 695:
A court has flexibility in determining what course of action to take following a violation
of the Charter.... Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 mandates the striking down of
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, but only "to the extent
of the inconsistency." Depending upon the circumstances, a court may simply strike
down ... or it may resort to the techniques of reading down or reading in. In addition, s.
24 of the Charter extends to any court of competent jurisdiction the power to grant an
"appropriate and just" remedy.
Further, when the majority provided guidelines for choice of an appropriate remedy, although
the judgment discussed reading in, the cases referred to dealt with reading down or constitutional
exemptions. Under this approach there would be very little need for individualized constitutional
exemptions under section 24 of the Charter. The majority judgment indicated that a section 24
remedy would usually be superfluous where a section 52 remedy was granted. It would not be
needed if the law were struck down, and would simply duplicate the effect of reading down or
reading in under section 52. However, in Rodriguez, ibid., the minority would have provided a
section 24 constitutional exemption as an individual remedy in conjunction with a delayed striking
down of the law.
120 In Big M, supra note 7, the religious purpose of the Sunday closing rule meant that it had
to be struck down entirely. Creating exemptions to it would not have been an adequate remedy. In
Edwards Books, supra note 5, on the other hand, the Sunday closing rule had a secular purpose. The
majority did not reach the question of remedy because it found the rule including the statutory form
of exemption to be reasonable. The majority did indicate that, had the section I test not been met,
it would have had to consider the application of a constitutional exemption.
121 The majority decision in Schachter, supra note 13 at 699-700, referred to Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, as an example. In that case, a majority of the court
found that the rational connection test was probably not met. It is logical that, in most such cases,
the appropriate remedial choice will be to strike down the entire portion of the legislation that fails
on this element of the proportionality test. The objective of the law would not be furthered by
upholding legislation that lacks a rational connection as it stands.
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ensure that the narrowed law is defined with adequate precision,122 that
it remains consistent with the legislative objective,123 and that its
122 If reading down would require the court to make "ad hoc choices from a variety of options,
none of which [is] pointed to with sufficient precision by the interaction between the statute in
question and the requirements of the Constitution," this indicates that the task should be left to the
legislature: Schachter, ibid. at 707. For example, in Hunter v.Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at
169, where law did not adequately limit a power of search and seizure, it was the "legislature's
responsibility to enact legislation that embodies appropriate safeguards;" the courts should not "fill
in the details that will render legislative lacunae constitutional." This concern was referred by to
Lzmer CJ.C., in dissent in Rodriguez, supra note 6, as a reason not to read down the Criminal Code
prohibition of assisted suicides. However, he did not find a similar problem with regard to the
constitutional exemption remedy, thus distinguishing the availability of these remedies in a manner
not apparent in other jurisprudence. Another example referred to in Schachter, ibid. at 276, was
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter Rocket]: the
court should not rewrite overly limited exceptions to a general prohibition on advertising by
dentists. See also the discussion of constitutional exemption in R. v. Seaboyer, [19911 2 S.C.R. 577
[hereinafter Seaboyer], where the majority held that the Criminal Code ban on evidence of prior
sexual activity should be struck down, rather than subjected to constitutional exemptions. One
reason advanced was that there would be significant difficulty in applying the exemption: "[t]his
amounts to saying that [the law] should not be applied when it should not be applied, unless some
criterion outside the Charter is found" (at 628-29). The formulation of this issue of remedial
precision is criticized in Roach, supra note 15, paras. 14.810-14.820. In Rodriguez, ibid. Lamer
CJ.C., in his discussion of the constitutional exemption, referred to this requirement and found it to
be satisfied.
12 3 If the effect of reading down changes the law substantially, and would therefore interfere
with the legislature's objective, reading down will not be appropriate. The advantage of reading
down is that it permits a law to remain in place, and to apply as intended, subject to a relatively
minor qualification. The Supreme Court of Canada has rejected reading down where it would
result in a substantial change to the law. In Osborne v. Canada (Treasuy Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69
at 101, Sopinka 3. referred to the remedies of reading down and the constitutional exemption as
"companions" and found neither one to be appropriate. In discussing the choice of remedy,
Sopinka . commented that, while the court must remedy Charter violations, it should "refrain from
intruding into the legislative sphere beyond what is necessary to give full effect to the provisions of
the Charter. ... Reading down may in some cases be the remedy that achieves [these] objectives ...
The same result may on occasion be obtained by resort to the constitutional exemption" (at 104-05).
The law in issue-banning political activity by public servants-would be invalid in many of its
applications and would, "as a result of wholesale reading down, bear little resemblance to the law
that Parliament passed. ... In these circumstances it is preferable to strike out the section to the
extent of its inconsistency" (at 105). In Seaboyer, ibid. at 628, McLachlin . for the majority referred
to reading down and the constitutional exemption as techniques to declare the legislation "valid in
part" and held that the doctrine of constitutional exemption should not be applied because the
result would not substantially uphold the law as enacted:
It would import into the provision an element which the legislature specifically chose to
exclude-the discretion of the trial judge. Add to this the host of judge-made procedures
which have been proposed to effect this judicial amendment to the legislation, and the
will of the legislature becomes increasingly obscured. \The exemption, while perhaps
saving the law in one sense, dramatically alters it in another.
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significance is not unduly changed.124 Where these criteria are not met,
the court should elect to strike down the law.
To date, the court has tended to strike out laws, rather than
tailor specific remedies, arguing that this approach best observes its
policy of minimizing interfering with the role of the legislature.125 If that
approach is to be reassessed, it should be done openly and with clear
consideration of the policy implications. The effect of the chosen
remedy should be assessed in an inquiry similar to that undertaken in
Schachter. The purposes underlying the choice of remedy and the grant
of standing are quite distinct. None of these purposes will be achieved if
standing law is employed as an indirect way of limiting the effect of the
Charter.126
124 This involves considerations of the interrelatedness of the entire law. InDevine v. Quebec
(AG.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, the challenged language law limiting the use of English on commercial
signs constituted a single scheme. The court struck down extreme portions of the law. To not strike
down other less extreme ones would leave comparatively more restrictions, rather than less, in those
areas where government felt some leeway was needed. Therefore the whole law should be struck
down. Similarly in Morgentaler #1, supra note 43, the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code were
a comprehensive code. The court struck down the whole law, not selected portions.
The social significance of the remaining portion of the law is also of concern. If the challenged
law is significant or long standing, and especially if it is "encouraged" by the Constitution, it is more
important for the court to try to fashion a narrow remedy rather than strike down the whole law.
This principle has been applied in cases involving human rights legislation: see, for example, Bainey
v. Ontario Hockey Ass'n (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (CA), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied [1986] 1
S.C.R. xii; Haig v. Canada (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.); and Vrend v. Alberta (1994), 152 A.R. 1
(Q.B.).
125 In Wholesale Travel, supra note 117, Lamer CJ.C. for the majority held that any incidental
benefit to the corporate accused was an insufficient reason to alter the court's usual remedy of
declaring the law to be of no force and effect.
Reading down or constitutional exemptions remain exceptional, and declarations of invalidity
the usual remedy. No majority judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada has yet applied the
constitutional exemption, and reading down has seldom been used in circumstances in which the
remedy would be clearly at odds with legislative intention. (For an exception, see R. v. Grant, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 223, discussed in Roach, supra note 15, para. 14.490, wherein the court read down a
statutory search power to restrict it to emergent circumstances). While there are a number of cases
where the court has interpreted broad or ambiguous statutes narrowly so as to avoid Charter
concerns that would otherwise arise, the court has been very reluctant to use one of these remedies
to overcome a clear mandatory provision. Even the dissenting judgment in Rodriguez, supra note 6,
which would have employed a constitutional exemption, had significant reservations about this
remedy. Lamer CJ.C. indicated that, while a constitutional exemption was necessary to remedy the
Charter violation he found to exist, the exemption should only be used as a temporary measure
accompanying a delayed striking down of the law. There are some examples of use of constitutional
exemptions by lower courts, but these are also exceptions to the usual approach of striking down
laws. See, generally, Roach, supra note 15 at 14-7-14-36.
126 In Wholesale Travel, ibid., as indicated above, the court declined to link standing and
remedies issues. None of the case law links the issues of standing and remedy. The issue of
standing is a preliminary one, a decision which the court should make. Once that decision is made,
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E. Conclusion Regarding Traditional Private Standing
The denial of standing in Hy and Zel's was inexplicable in terms
of the purposes underlying standing. While the court may need to
rethink its freedom of religion rulings, or the appropriate form of
remedy in such cases, these concerns are simply avoided rather than
properly considered by the use of strict standing rules. It seems clear
that the approach of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Hy and Zel's was correct, and
that plaintiffs with traditional private standing under the Smith rule
should have access to the court and should be entitled to rely on the
Charter rights of others in civil proceedings, including declaratory
actions, as well as in criminal proceedings. Granting standing to these
persons is consistent with the purposes of standing law relating to the
efficient use of judicial resources. The economic motivations behind the
litigation imply that such plaintiffs will be involved in litigation in any
event and, if prevented from raising Charter issues in one proceeding,
may be back before the court in another form of action. However,
concerns relating to the provision of an adequate factual context may
favour the presentation of the issue in another action, brought by
persons more closely related to the Charter rights and freedoms
involved. Thus it is probably wise to treat this as a discretionary form of
standing. If the issue is better presented in another action that is
ongoing or will clearly be undertaken, the court may decline to recognize
the standing of the plaintiff in favour of the better plaintiff and better
presentation of the issue.
V. THE "SECTION 24" PLAINTIFF: A NEW FORM OF PRIVATE
STANDING
A. Support for a New Form of Private Standing
While the Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated a
restrictive approach to both public interest and traditional private
the plaintiff's position does not affect the court's view of what is an appropriate remedy, although it
may mean that the plaintiff will not benefit from the granted remedy. This occurred in R. v. WMdson
(1993), 86 B.C.LR. (2d) 103 (CA.) where it was argued that the considerations of standing and
remedy should be linked, but the court declined to do this. The accused had standing to argue the
violation of others' Charter rights under the rule in Big M, supra note 7. His counsel argued that the
law should be struck down, not read down, because his client had standing and because that was the
only way he would personally benefit. The court held that the appropriate remedy depended on the
factors set out in Schachter, supra note 13, not on the person who raised the constitutional
challenge.
1995]
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standing in Charter declaratory actions, it has provided at least implicit
support for a new form of private standing. This implicit support is also
available in a number of lower court decisions. I address this new form
of standing not as a substitute for other forms of standing, but as a useful
additional approach.
Many Charter cases have been brought by persons who did not
have, in the words of Laskin C.J.C. in Borowski #1, a "special interest ...
beyond the general interest that is common to all members of the
relevant society."127 These cases involved actions or applications for
declarations that regulatory legislation infringed the Charter. In most,
but not all, cases the plaintiff or applicant was subject to the regulation,
but no proceedings had been commenced or threatened. The parties,
therefore, were not as clearly within the traditional rules for private
standing as the corporate parties in Hy and Zel's. But the parties were
more clearly connected to the Charter issues raised, and therefore would
not be barred from standing by the Hy and Zel's ruling.
In Somerville v. Canada (A.G.),128 an individual applicant, simply
by establishing his eligibility to vote,129 was entitled to seek a declaration
that amendments to the Canada Elections Act3o infringed sections 2(b)
and 3 of the Charter. The statutory provisions in question were
regulatory, limiting third party spending on election advertising to $1,000
and making overspending an offence. Somerville was not even required
to take the step undertaken by Smith, of showing an intended and
frustrated business transaction. If Somerville could bring the action,
clearly any eligible elector could.131
127 Supra note 15 at 578.
128 [1993] AJ. No. 504 (QJ.) [hereinafter Somerville].
129 This was done in an affidavit filed in the application. The judgment does not mention
standing, and counsel for the applicant advised the author in a telephone conversation that it was
not raised in argument.
130 S.C 1993, c. 19.
131 In an earlier declaratory action involving an earlier version of the same legislation,
National Citizens'Coalition Inc v. Canada (AG.) (1984), 11 D.L1L (4th) 481 at 485 (Alta. Q.B.),
the standing of the two plaintiffs-the National Citizen's Coalition Inc. and an individual citizen
who was a member of that organization-was challenged on the ground that "the plaintiffs had not
shown any special interest in the impugned law other than that of a general nature." The court held
that public interest standing was available to both plaintiffs. This approach was also adopted in
Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (AG.) (1993), 145 A.R. 272 (CA). The case dealt with Canada
Elections Act, ibid, provisions reserving and allocating political broadcast time. Standing was
granted to a political party, found to be directly affected by the provisions, and to an individual
candidate and members found to be genuinely interested in the issues.
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Thus, standing was uncontroversial in circumstances directly
analogous to those prevailing in Smith. Somerville is one of an increasing
number of public rights claims which is also a legitimate and, indeed,
pressing use of judicial resources. The case decided an important
constitutional issue of practical import to many people, following a
hearing in which the issue was identified in an adequately precise
manner, pertinent evidence was called, and argument for both sides of
the issue was presented.
There are examples of this form of standing that have reached
the level of the Supreme Court of Canada. Edmonton Journal132
involved a challenge to a statutory provision prohibiting the media from
publishing material in court documents. There had been no
prosecutions commenced or threatened. The publisher of the
Edmonton Journal brought a declaration application. Its standing was
not questioned.133
Danson3 4 was an application for a declaration that Ontario
Rules of Civil Procedure providing for the imposition of costs personally
against a lawyer violated the Charter. The application was brought
without any factual context. The ensuing problems, which resulted in
dismissal of the application, were not characterized as related to the
status of the plaintiff. 35 The plaintiff was a lawyer and as such might be
threatened with legal consequences of a regulatory nature. Rather than
132 Supra note 67.
133 There was some discussion regarding its standing as a corporation to invoke section 15.
However, there was no suggestion by either the parties or the court that it lacked sufficient private
rights (freedom of expression), special interest, or damage to bring the action under section 2(b):
ib at 1382, per La Forest J. in dissent, rev'g on other grounds (1987), 78 A.R. 375 at 380 (C.A.),
aff'g (1985), 63 AR. 114 at 116 (Q.B.).
134 Supra note 65.
135 Ibid. In the first instance, (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 405 at 410 [H.CJ.], McRae J. held that
Danson represented, in the terms adopted from Strayer, supra note 17 at 146, "not the public, but an
interested class of which he is a member," and that, as a member of the Ontario Bar, he was
"imminently threatened with legal consequences of a regulatory or enforcement nature." In the
Ontario Court of Appeal, (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 676 at 681,per Finlayson J.A., it was indicated that
standing, which the court characterized as public interest standing, would be determined on the
hearing of the application; the concurring judges did not deal with this point. The court confined its
decision on the preliminary objection to the application to the issue of an adequate factual
undertaking. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Danson, ibid. at 1102, indicated that the application
could not proceed in the absence of a factual foundation, adding that "[iut is not necessary that the
appellant prove that the impugned rules were applied against him personally (standing not being an
issue); but he must present admissible evidence that the effects of the impugned rules violate
provisions of the Charter."
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awaiting an order of costs against him, he brought a declaration
application.1 36
In Information Retailers Ass'n of Metropolitan Toronto Inc. v.
Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality of),137 an incorporated association of
individual and corporate booksellers, and a publishers' association, were
held, without discussion, to have status to bring an application for a
declaration that by-laws regulating the sale of erotic books and
magazines were invalid because of conflict with the Charter. In
O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (A.G.),138 a union and individual public servants
had status to seek a declaration that legislation restricting political
activity by public servants and unions contravened the Charter. Klein v.
Law Society of Upper Canadal39 was a Charter challenge, brought by a
lawyer who was not under threat of any disciplinary proceedings, to law
society rules prohibiting advertising 40 Institute of Edible Oil Foods v.
Ontario1 4) was a declaratory application by a trade association, wherein
two corporate members and an individual consumer challenged the
validity of legislation regulating the colouring of margarine under
sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter.142
These cases indicate at least a liberalization, if not an
abandonment, of the Smith exceptional prejudice requirement.
Canadian courts have not insisted that regulatory proceedings be
commenced or threatened, at least where there are economic
implications, or where a class of persons, rather than the public at large,
is affected43 In some of the cases, negative economic implications are
136 See also MacKay, supra note 69 at 360, wherein the court's support for the applicant's
standing was somewhat more equivocal; it held that the "important issue" of standing had not been
considered because it had not been raised by the parties.
137 (1984), 48 O.X, (2d) 290 (H.CJ. Div. Ct.), aff'd (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 449 (CA).
138 (1988), 65 O.P (2d) 689 (H.cJ.).
139 (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 118 (H.CJ. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Kiein].
140 In the companion case to Klein, ibid., law society proceedings had been instituted.
141 (1987), 63 O.R. (2d) 436 (H.CJ.), aff'd (1989), 71 O.R. (2d) 158 (CA) [hereinafterEdible
OilFoods].
142 The corporations were held not to have status to raise section 15 rights, but the individual
consumer's status was assumed. Further, the status of all applicants pertaining to the section 2(b)
challenge was assumed. For other examples of private standing, see D. Gibson, The Law of the
Charter General Principles (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 265, where the author refers to a "wide
range of circumstances" in which private standing has been recognized in Charter challenges.
143 The cases referred to (other than Somerville, supra note 128) differ from Smilh,supra note
14, in that the prolbitions applied to more limited classes of persons, but in each of them the
persons bringing the application were in no different position than the "relevant society" (supra
note 100 and accompanying text). Potential litigators may not include every resident or citizen but
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not obvious, but there was an interference with a business activity or
transaction, such as the publishing of particular information or the
purchase of political advertising. One consumer plaintiff, however, was
affected neither economically nor in her business activities and,
therefore, joined in Edible Oil Foods.1 44 There is a particularly
compelling argument that consumers with an interest in receiving
prohibited commercial expression should have standing to challenge
regulatory laws because the courts have relied, to a significant degree, on
consumers' constitutionally protected interest in receiving information
as the basis for upholding challenges to laws brought by advertisers.145
B. The Impact of Section 24
While alternative bases for justifying private standing arguably
exist in most of the cases, the only apparent source of the standing of the
consumer-and what may well be the operative basis for the standing of
other plaintiffs who coincidentally suffered an economic detriment or
had their business activities curtailed-is the violation of a Charter right
or freedom simpliciter. The breach of a Charter right or freedom does
not fall in the category of rights traditionally actionable in private law
that give rise to private standing (as an alternative to the Smith
requirement of exceptional prejudice arising out of violation of a public
right).146 Nonetheless, private persons whose rights are infringed are
entitled to a remedy under section 24 of the Charter.1 47 Further, there is
still involve significant numbers. Strayer, supra note 17 at 146, indicates that this situation falls
between purely "private" and purely "public" actions, and that "the problem of standing to sue
arises just as in the purely'public' action." The question of prematurity is discussed in Sharpe, supra
note 23 at 340-42; and Hogg, supra note 20 at 1277-78.
144 The Institute itself, and the Information Retailers Association, were also unaffected,
unless they are treated as representatives of the economic interests of their members. See also
Conseil du Patronat, supra note 71.
145 In cases brought by advertisers, they have, at least in part, relied on the rights of third
parties: Irwin Toy, supra note 5; and Rocket, supra note 122.
146 Finlay, supra note 15 at 619, referring to private rights which give rise to "an actionable
wrong within the categories of private law" (citing S.M. Thio, Locus Standi and Judicial Review
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1971) at 161) or a right created by statute for the benefit of
a plaintiff (referring to L Zamir, The Declaratory Judgment (London: Stevens & Sons, 1962) at 269).
147 Declaratory proceedings pertaining to the constitutionality of statutes or regulations are
generally considered under section 52, not section 24; the Supreme Court of Canada in Schachter,
supra note 13 at 720, indicated that "[alan individual remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter will
rarely be available in conjunction with an action under section 52 of the Constitution Act 1982." But
this was because an individual remedy would either be superfluous or inconsistent with the general
remedy. This does not deny that section 24(2) may be influential in defining the types of rights or
1995]
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a case for arguing that, in some circumstances the existence of a law
whose terms violate a right or freedom, without an actual or even
threatened application, amounts to an infringement under section 24.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the existence of such
a law can deter persons from engaging in constitutionally protected
activity. This deterrence has influenced the court in its selection of an
appropriate remedy, and would seem to be an equally persuasive basis
for a grant of private standing to suej 48
The emphasis in Hy and Zel's on the desirability of parties who
are directly affected in the sense that their Charter rights are involved,
and the discounting of the traditional private interest, also support the
view that an effect on Charter rights or freedoms in and of itself should
be sufficient to ensure standing to seek a declaration that the law
conflicts with the Charter. While Hy and Zel's does not mandate this
conclusion, in that it could be that both traditional private standing and
interference with one's own Charter rights is required to bring such an
action, a two-pronged standing requirement seems unduly restrictive. It
could operate to bar claims by the individuals most closely linked to
Charter values, such as the consumer in the Edible Oil Foods case, or
minority religious employees whose working days are limited by Sunday
closing statutes, but who are not themselves subject to or threatened
with prosecution.
Section 24 supports a standing rule for declaratory actions
concerning violation of Charter rights and freedoms, to supplement the
traditional rules applied under section 52. Section 24 indicates that
private persons whose rights or freedoms have been infringed or denied
are entitled to an "appropriate and just" remedy. If the infringement or
denial is not accompanied by some injury compensable in damages, or by
a negative administrative decision, or some other personalized
grievance, it may be that the most appropriate and just remedy would be
a declaration of invalidity of a law. Therefore, standing for purposes of
such a declaration should depend simply on a showing of an
interests that give rise to private standing to sue for a declaration of invalidity due to conflict with
the Charter.
148 Rocket, supra note 122 at 252. The existence of this deterrent effect, without the
commencement or threat of enforcement proceedings, supports a present rather than merely a
future infringement of Charter rights or freedoms. Even if the infringement is regarded more as
threatened than actual, this would not prevent the application of section 24. See the discussion in
Roach, supra note 15, paras. 5.610-5.690 and the cases cited therein. The case of Rodiguez, supra
note 6 at 584-85,per Sopinka J., can also be characterized in this way. The criminal prohibition on
assisted suicide, either through its deterrent effect on Ms. Rodriguez and others whose assistance
she might seek, or through the potential application of the criminal prohibition, would have been
sufficient to show an infringement of section 7 had the other requirements of that section been met.
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infringement of the plaintiff's rights or freedoms. Section 24 does not
require, and a plaintiff should not have to prove, that he or she suffered
a corresponding interference with legal rights actionable under private
law, or some form of exceptional prejudice or special damage.1 49
This result is supported not only by the language of section 24,
but by its history as well. As described by Dale Gibson, the several drafts
of section 24 broadened its application. There was clearly a concern that
private persons be guaranteed access to the courts for the vindication of
Charter rights and freedoms. Private persons were intended to have a
major role in the maintenance of these public obligations.150
While this approach to private standing may be supported by
section 24, it is not compelled. Section 24 is not an independent source
of jurisdiction for the courts; a court resorted to under the section must
be "of competent jurisdiction." It must have, independent of the
Charter, jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.151 Thus it
may be that accessibility of parties to the court should be determined by
149 Much of the commentary on standing under section 24(1) of the Charter has generally
indicated that the requirement of a Charter infringement is a stricter test of standing than the public
interest standing available under section 52(1); but has not broadly explored the private standing
implications of section 24: Hogg, supra note 20 at 916-17; A.A. McClellan & B.P. Elman, "The
Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Analysis of Section 24" (1983)
21 Alta. L. Rev. 205 at 212-13; G.R. Garton, "Civil Litigation under the Charter" in N.R.
Finkelstein & B. MacLeod Rogers, eds., Charterlssues in Civil Cases (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 73 at
74-75.
However, other commentators have envisioned such a role for section 24. Strayer, supra note
17 at 185, has taken the position advocated here, suggesting that section 24 may clarify standing as
of right where a person's interests are "affected similarly to the interests of the public at large."
Strayer also discussed, at 156, the impact of a constitutionally protected freedom on McNeil's claim
for standing (see the discussion supra note 98 and accompanying text) and suggested, at 175-79, that
the combination of the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter and of section 24 reinforces the
common law position that the right to vote is a private legal right, and that denial of it may be
challenged in the courts by any voter.
Roach, ibid., para 5.410, in a discussion of section 24, indicated that "it is arguable that all
individuals have standing to assert rights to freedom of expression or voting rights because the
benefits of those rights are distributed so widely," citing in support of the former point Canadian
Civil Liberties, supra note 38, a case in which the court referred to the broad impact of the right as
supporting the Corporation's claim for public interest standing. S. Blake, in "Standing to Litigate
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in Canada and the United States" (1984) 16 Ottawa L. Rev. 66,
took the position that those whose Charter rights or freedoms have been affected should always be
entitled to standing, and that this is required by section 24. See also the comments of Bogart, supra
note 109 at 15-16, discussed infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
1 50 D. Gibson & S. Gibson, "Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed.,
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 781 at 784-86.
151 Mills, supra note 7; see, generally, Hogg, supra note 20 at 918-21; and Gibson, ibid. at 798-
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the normal rules which, in the case of private declaratory actions
regarding the constitutionality of legislation, depend on a showing of
exceptional prejudice. On the other hand, declaratory applications are
brought before the superior courts- courts of generaljurisdiction-which are always courts of competent jurisdiction for
section 24 relief.L52 Restrictions on standing to seek declaratory relief
are discretionary, not jurisdictional. 153 In exercising this discretion,
section 24 can provide a useful guide to an appropriate test of standing
for Charter declaratory actions. It is for this reason that I refer to this
form of standing as "section 24" standing, although the declaratory relief
sought may be fully within section 52, and may not require reliance on
section 24.154
C. Ripeness
There remains the issue of when Charter rights are infringed or
denied. Does the simple existence of a statute, without regulatory or
enforcement proceedings being brought or threatened, or without a
showing of exceptional prejudice, create an infringement or denial of a
Charter right? To condition standing, or an infringement under section
24, on the coexistence of private rights or exceptional prejudice gives rise
to the problem of allowing traditional legal interests to control the
impact of guarantees designed to protect entirely different interests.155
A better guide to standing for the purposes of the Charter is found by
examining its purposes directly, in other words, in the substantive law of
the Charter.
American jurisprudence provides an analogy. While standing
doctrine is constitutionally grounded, and is in at least some respects
narrower than Canadian doctrine,156 private standing in the United
States has expanded to include non-economic injury ("injury in fact"),
provided it falls within the "zone of interests to be protected" by the
152 Kowessis, supra note 83; and Hogg, ibid. at 918.
153 Thorson, supra note 17.
154 Schachter, supra note 13.
155 Roach, supra note 15, para. 5.320.
156 See the discussion in Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 10 at 246-48.
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constitutional guarantee in question.15 7 While standing may be denied
where "abstract questions ... amount to generalized grievances,"158 this
does not today result in a rule as restrictive as that applied in Smith or
described by Laskin C.J.C. in Borowski #1. This is clear from an
examination of the American doctrine of "ripeness" which governs the
appropriateness of pre-enforcement declaratory actions relating to
regulatory laws. Ripeness has similarities to standing in that it requires
concrete harm,159 but it focuses more on issues of timing rather than on
the identity of the plaintiff60
The ripeness of a constitutional claim depends on the nature of
the claim and of the constitutional provisions relied upon. The
American doctrine reflects, as I am suggesting standing in Charter
declaratory actions should, the substantive requirements of
demonstrating a constitutional violation. Different constitutional
provisions give rise to different degrees of concern about ripeness. Free
speech and electoral challenges are generally not challenged on ripeness
grounds. Because of concern about the deterrent effect of regulatory
157 L Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, New York. Foundation Press,
1988) at 108, citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State Inc., 545 U.S. 464 (1982) at 474-75.
158 Jbi
159 G.R. Nichol, Jr., "Ripeness and the Constitution" (1987) 54 U. Cli. L Rev. 153 at 170,
citing LL Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Boston: little, Brown and Co., 1965) at
417:
By applying a more sensitive measurement of concrete injury, the Court has substantially
liberalized access to judicial review over the past three decades. Gradually, the Court has
alleviated the traditional dilemma of the federal plaintiff seeking to challenge the
constitutionality of government regulation. No longer do the principles of federal
jurisdiction require that he become a lawbreaker in order to get into court. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court has concluded, with Professor Jaffe, that "even a wrongdoer is
entitled to know his rights." Moreover, ripeness decisions repeatedly have recognized the
present harms that flow from the threat of future sanction.
160 Tribe, supra note 157 at 78, citing, with added emphasis, Communist Party of the United
Statesv. SubversiveActivities ControlBoard, 367 U.S. 1 at 79 (1961):
Findings of nonjusticiability based on this concern typically arise when a litigant has
challenged at an early stage, often in a suit for declaratory relief the constitutionality of a
statutory or regulatory scheme. In such cases the litigant may have a plausible claim that
the challenged provision, by somehow limiting his available legal options, threatens him
with direct injury sufficient to confer standing to sue. But standing doctrine discusses
only "what issues a litigant might raise, not when he might raise them. That a proper
party is before [a] court is not answer to the objection that he is there prematurely"--that
he raises unduly "hypothetical" or "abstract" issues.
The reasoning in Smith relied substantially on the hypothetical nature of the issue, as noted
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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legislation on speech, the mere passage of a statute is taken to injure
free expression interests. Other constitutional rights, such as equal
protection and due process, have been defined in a more context-
specific- manner and have been made subject to more stringent ripeness
requirements.161
In addition to the substantive requirements of the particular
constitutional guarantee, ripeness also depends on the nature of the
alleged violation and on the evidence that will be necessary to establish
it. In some circumstances, "hypothetical" facts have a reasonable degree
of certainty, or do not affect the court's ability to determine the merits.
Exceptions have developed to the ripeness requirement where it is clear
that the challenged law applies to the plaintiff's activities-so that the
plaintiff must refrain from these activities or face reasonably certain
enforcement-or where the issues presented are legal and will not be
affected by factual developments.162 These factors likewise should
influence a Canadian court's assessmentj 63
161 Tribe, ibid. at 167. As an example of this contrast, the author notes that while legislative
schemes imposing prior restraints on expression have been struck down because of a potential for
arbitrary enforcement, schemes challenged on equal protection grounds have been required to show
actual discriminatory enforcement, not merely the potential. For a Canadian example, consider Re
Ontario Film and Vueo Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 583
(Div. Ct.), affd (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80 (CA.), in which a power to censor was struck down(although on the ground that the limit on expression was so vague as not to be prescribed by law), as
compared with R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257. In the latter case, Cory J. for the majority
found that a police power to randomly stop motor vehicles was not invalid, but indicated that a
constitutional remedy would be available in the case of improper applications of the power.
162 Tribe, ibU at 80-81.
163 The Supreme Court of Canada in Smith, supra note 14, did not undertake such an inquhy.
If it had, it would seem clear that the issue was not really hypothetical, and certainly not in a way
that affected the court's ability to determine the merits. Smith had ordered and been refused
liquor, the application of the statute to his action was clear and the issues he raised would not have
been affected by further developments in the facts. Three of the four judges did, in fact, examine
the merits on alternate reasons. See also Cromwell, supra note 19 at 74. Strayer, supra note 17 at
211-12 refers to the court's consideration of the merits as evidence that Canadian courts have
generally been willing to decide speculative issues, provided that they are adequately precise. He
contrasts Smith with Saumur v. Quebec (A.G.), [1964] 2 S.C.R. 252, in which the issues were not
sufficiently precise and were not answered by the court. In that case, the plaintiff sought a
declaration that a statute prohibiting the distribution of literature abusive to religion was
unconstitutional, and that it did not apply to the plaintiffs activities. The latter issue could not be
resolved in the absence of specific facts.
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D. Implications of Section 24 Standing
William Bogart has argued that "[a]ttacks on statutes and
subordinate legislation make easier targets for a claim to standing based
primarily on the importance of adherence to the Charter."1 64 He gave as
an example McNeil, whose interest in viewing movies, while "more
fragile and tangential in a conventional sense than the movie operators
pointing to their ledger sheets,"1 65 nonetheless "had value, could be
recognized and was inexorably connected to the very issues in the
lawsuit-the boundaries of the power of the censor."166 Bogart went on
to argue that there should be limits on the entitlement to challenge the
constitutionality of legislation, giving as an example a challenge to a
municipal by-law restricting the size of signs during town elections,
suggesting that only residents or candidates should have status to
challenge the constitutionality of this legislation: "[iut may be that a piece
of unconstitutional legislation is operating but its impact is limited and
its "victims" seem to have freely accepted its consequences." 67
Approaching standing as an issue of whether there has been,
substantively, an infringement of the plaintiff's Charter rights and
freedoms would give the result Bogart seeks. In the McNeil scenario, the
plaintiff who could provide evidence of a desire to view censored films
could show an infringement of his or her own section 2(b) rights. The
statute challenged was a provincial statute and would affect the right of
all moviegoers resident in the province, as McNeil was. In the case of
the municipal by-law, a person either deterred from placing signs in the
municipality, or who resided in the municipality and whose receipt of
information was affected, would have a basis for showing a violation of
his or her Charter rights or freedoms. It is not a matter of coincidence
that the result sought by Bogart is obtained. By examining the issue of
standing in the context of asserting a violation of the Charter, the
purposive interpretation of the right or freedom guides the court in
determining whether the asserted interest "[has] value, [can] be
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recognized and [is] inexorably connected to the very issues in the
lawsuit."168
Consider the description of private standing by Laskin C.J.C. in
Borowski #1,169 when he asserted that a passionate believer in the right
to use marijuana would not be entitled to challenge, in a declaratory
action, a criminal prohibition of possession. If a plaintiff could make an
arguable case that marijuana smoking was a Charter-protected activity
that he or she wished to engage in, perhaps as part of a religious
ceremony,17 then there is a good case for private standing to challenge
the law. If the activity which the plaintiff seeks to engage in can be
clearly described, may be constitutionally protected, and is prohibited by
the challenged law, then nothing is gained and something is lost by
denying standing. Like Somerville, the case would determine an
important constitutional issue of practical import, following a hearing in
which the issue is identified in an adequately precise manner and
pertinent evidence is presented. The case would not become better
suited for adjudication by awaiting a prosecution. Indeed, a provincial
court trial may well be less appropriate than a superior court action for
the preparation and presentation of evidence on the religious and socialpolicy issues that would be involved. A denial of standing would deny
the full protection of Charter rights; individuals may be deterred by fear
of criminal sanction from engaging in constitutionally protected activity.
Examining the matter in terms of the impact of granting standing
on concerns of judicial economy and concerns relating to the
requirements of the adversarial system leads to the same conclusion.
The declaratory action could serve judicial economy by determining an
issue of application in a multitude of penal proceedings. A multitude of
Charter declaratory applications is unlikely because of the personal and
financial cost of bringing the suit. The plaintiff's position as directly
affected by the Charter rights involved, even if not by the penal aspects of
168 jb1& Later in the same article, at 22-23, Bogart gives qualified support for the result in Big
M, supra note 7, arguing that standing should not be restricted to those whose own Charter rights are
affected. Section 24 standing is one useful approach, but is not a substitute for other forms of
standing.
169 Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
170 In People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716 (1964), discussed in Tribe, supra note 157 at 1247, the
California Supreme Court held unconstitutional the application of a state criminal statute to nativeAmericans using peyote in a religious ceremony. But the United States Supreme Court susequently
rejected such a claim in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources (Or.) v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872(1990).
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the law, would support both his or her representativeness on this issue,
and his or her ability to provide a concrete factual background 17
"Section 24" standing will not provide an adequate substitute for
public interest standing. There will remain cases where it will be difficult
to identify any party whose Charter rights have been infringed, as in
Thorson and Borowski #1. Where widely-held Charter rights have been
affected, as in McNeil, the cost and inconvenience of litigation may mean
that section 24 parties will not be forthcoming. If they do come forward,
these sort of cases may be nominal substitutes for public interest
organizations. In these circumstances, it would seem appropriate to
allow the organizations to bring the actions directly, rather than through
such a ruse. At the very least, where organizations include among their
members those who would have section 24 standing, this should give
additional credence to their claim for standing.
"Section 24" standing is also not an adequate substitute for
private standing. Again, the cost and inconvenience of litigation must be
considered. Because of these factors, it is likely that many important
Charter issues will be heard only if parties with traditional private
interests are permitted to raise them. Only parties who suffer financially
may be willing to make the financial investment to challenge the law. It
would be unfortunate to lose the incidental, but substantial, societal
benefits that may be obtained from this type of litigation.
Nonetheless, this form of standing provides a useful additional
approach. By definition, section 24 standing focuses on rights and
freedoms protected by the Charter, so that access to Charter review will
depend upon a direct consideration of these vital, but non-traditional
interests, rather than upon coincident traditional interests. Further, a
development of the law concerning the ripeness of particular
1 71 Little Sisters Book andArt Emporium v. Canada (M'mister of Justice), [1992] B.CJ. No. 2351
(Q.L) provides an analogy. The court refused to exercise its discretion against hearing a
declaratory action. A retailer of gay and lesbian literature sought a declaration that customs
legislation violated section 2(b) of the Charter. Its standing was not questioned, but the Minister of
Justice sought to strike out the declaratory action, arguing that challenges to the legislation should
be brought in the context of the review of specific customs decisions. Issues of ripeness or
abstractness were thus raised. The court held that the nature of the challenge, which was to the
customs process rather than a specific decision, was properly dealt with in a declaratory action and
noted that the plaintiff retailer was in a good position to provide a concrete factual context at the
trial. While the plaintiff possessed a traditional private interest (interference with economic
transactions) as well as interference with its freedom of expression under the Charter, and its
standing was not in issue, the issues and the nature of the court's discretionary power are similar to
those which would arise in the standing issue described in the text. The court was exercising a
discretionary power as to whether it should hear the action and, in doing so, considered adversarial
concerns relating to the provision of an adequate factual context for determination of the issue.
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constitutional claims will increase our understanding of the nature of the
rights and freedoms and of the dynamics that cause their infringement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Standing requirements are intended to ensure the efficient use of
our scarce judicial resources. In doing this, they may control access to
the court, but must allow sufficient access so that the court's function of
overseeing government compliance with the Charter can be realized.
Standing requirements are also intended to ensure that cases which
come before the courts satisfy the requirements of the adversarial
process, so that the court's jurisprudence will be realistic and useful. An
issue must be defined with some precision, and be fully argued by a
motivated advocate, if this is to be achieved. In some, but not all cases,
the provision of a factual context, involving the application of the law
subject to Charter challenge, will also contribute to this goal.
A review of the law pertaining to public interest and private
standing in declaratory actions involving the Charter indicates that the
Supreme Court of Canada has adopted an overly restrictive approach to
standing that does not respond to these purposes. In Canadian Council
of Churches, the court barred a public interest organization from access
to Charter review of immigration laws because traditional private
litigation could raise and in fact was raising similar issues. While the
result in the case may have been consistent with the objectives of
standing law, the Court's restrictive description of the availability of
public interest standing was not. This restrictive approach was applied in
Hy and Zel's, and public interest standing was denied in circumstances
where adversarial concerns and the need for efficient use of judicial
resources supported a grant of standing.
The Irwin Toy rule, applied in Hy and Zel's as a rule of standing,
means that the traditional form of private standing is not available in
Charter declaratory actions or other civil proceedings. The need to
restrict this form of standing in absolute terms has not been justified by
the Supreme Court of Canada. A purposive approach, as adopted by the
dissent in Hy and Zel's, would better meet concerns about this form of
standing.
While the approach in these cases needs rethinking, another
development in standing law, described as "section 24" standing, holds
promise. This is a new form of private standing and will not substitute
for public interest standing in all cases, but may provide an alternative
approach where widely-held Charter rights or freedoms are sought to be
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enforced. It is hoped that in the future development of this concept, the
courts will focus on both the purposes of standing rules and their
obligation to enforce the Charter, and will develop Charter-directed
guidelines for standing that will not be limited by a concern with the
co-existence of other, more traditional, private interests.

